Scusate l'ho erroneamente mandato su indymedia italy se potete toglietelo da li.
by lametta Monday, Mar. 06, 2006 at 6:45 PM mail:




vorrei prima di tutto inserire questa lettura ( in inglese )che non ho letto completamente ma conosco nel merito, dopo vi lascio un articolo che ho anche pubblicato in imc italy.
Aggiungo che il primo nemico assoluto e la creazione di gerarchie accentranti rispetto al pensiero anarchico e di pacifisti che cito in una poesia nella lettura.
Intendo dire che non so cosa sia il F.A.I. ma mi interessa il dialogo ed il confronto e non le strutture che siano dirigenziali (ripeto non conosco queste realta quindi il mio e solo un personalissimo preambolo e non una affermazione).

Ethics
See CULTURAL RELATIVISM; ETHICS AND EVOLUTION;
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Ethics and Evolution
When Charles DARWIN wrote The Origin of Species, he
withheld discussion of the origins of human morality and
cognition. Despite Darwin’s restraint, some of the strongest
reactions to the theory of natural selection had to do with its
connection to ethical matters. The intersection between evolution
and ethics continues to be a site of controversy. Some
claim that human ethical judgments are to be explained by
their adaptive value. Others claim that human ethical systems
are the result of cultural evolution, not biological evolution.
In the context of cognitive science, the central issue
is whether humans have ethics-specific beliefs or cognitive
mechanisms that are the result of biological evolution.
There is increasing evidence that the human brain comes
prewired for a wide range of specialized capacities (see
NATIVISM and DOMAIN SPECIFICITY). With regard to ethics,
the central questions are to what extent the human brain is
prewired for ethical thinking and, insofar as it is, what the
implications of this are.
There is one sense in which humans are prewired for ethics:
humans have the capacity for ethical reasoning and
reflection while amoebas do not. This human capacity is
biologically based and results from EVOLUTION. Ethical
nativism is the view that there are specific, prewired mechanisms
for ethical thought. Adherents of SOCIOBIOLOGY, the
view that evolutionary theory can explain all human social
behavior, are among those who embrace ethical nativism. E.
O. Wilson, in Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), goes
so far as to say that ethics can be “biologized.” Sociobiologists
claim that humans have specific ethical beliefs and an
associated ethical framework that are innate and are the
result of natural selection. They support this view with evidence
that humans in all cultures share certain ethical
beliefs and certain underlying ethical principles (see HUMAN
UNIVERSALS), evidence of ethical or “pre-ethical” behavior
among other mammals, especially primates (see de Waal
1996), and with evolutionary accounts of the selective
advantage of having innate ethical mental mechanisms.
Most notably, they talk about the selective advantage (to the
individual or to the species) of ALTRUISM.
Consider a particular moral belief or feeling for which an
evolutionary explanation has been offered, namely the belief
that it is wrong to have (consensual) sex with one’s sibling.
Some sociobiologists have argued that this belief (more precisely,
the feeling that there is something wrong about having
sex with a person one was raised with) is innate and that
we have this belief because of its selective advantage. When
close blood relatives reproduce, there is a relatively high
chance that traits carried on recessive genes (most notably,
serious diseases like sickle-cell anemia and hemophilia) will
be exhibited in the resulting offspring. Such offspring are
thus more likely to fail to reproduce. Engaging in incest is
thus an evolutionarily nonadaptive strategy. If a mutation
occurred that caused an organism to feel or believe that it is
wrong to engage in incest, then, all else being equal, this
gene would spread through the population over subsequent
generations. Sociobiologists think they can give similar
accounts of our other ethical beliefs and the mechanisms
that underlie them.
What are the implications for ethics if ethical nativism
and some version of the sociobiological story behind it are
true? Some philosophers have denied there are any interesting
implications. Ethics, they note, is normative (it says
what we ought to do), whereas biology—in particular, the
details of the evolutionary origins of humans and our various
capacities—is descriptive. One cannot derive normative
conclusions from empirical premises. To do so is to commit
the naturalistic fallacy. It would be a mistake, for example,
to infer from the empirical premise that our teeth evolved
for tearing flesh to the normative conclusions that we ought
to eat meat. This empirical premise is compatible with ethical
arguments that it is morally wrong to eat meat. By the
same reasoning, the fact that evolution produced in us the
tendency to have some moral feeling or belief does not necessarily
entail that we ought to act on that feeling or accept
that belief on reflection. In fact, some commentators have
suggested, following Thomas Huxley (1894), that “the ethical
progress of society depends, not on imitating [biological
evolution], . . . but in combating it.”
Ethical nativists have various responses to the charge that
they commit the naturalistic fallacy. Some allow that the fact
that humans have some innate moral belief does not entail
that we ought to act on it, while insisting that nativism has
something to tell us about ethics. Perhaps biology can tell us
that we are not able to do certain things and thus that it cannot
be the case that we ought to do this. For example, concerning
feminism, some sociobiologists have claimed that
many of the differences between men and women are biologically
based and unchangeable; a feminist political
agenda that strives for equality is therefore destined to failure.
This argument has been criticized on both empirical
and normative grounds (see Kitcher 1985 and Fausto-
Sterling 1992).
Some sociobiologists (Wilson 1975 and Ruse 1986) have
argued that the facts of human evolution have implications
for moral realism, the metaethical position that there are
moral facts like, for example, the moral fact that it is wrong
to torture babies for fun. A standard argument for moral
realism says that the existence of moral facts explains the
fact that we have moral beliefs (on moral realism, see Harman
1977; Mackie 1977; Brink 1989). If, however, ethical
nativism is true and an evolutionary account can be given
for why people have the moral beliefs they do, then an
empirical explanation can be given for why we have the ethical
capacities that we do. The standard argument for moral
realism is thus undercut.
One promising reply to this line of thought is to note
that moral facts might be involved in giving a biological
account of why we humans have the moral beliefs that we
do. In the case of incest, the moral status of incest might
be related to the selective advantageousness of incest.
Consider an analogy to mathematics. Although we might
give an evolutionary explanation of the spread of mathematical
abilities in humans (say, because the ability to
perform addition was useful for hunting), mathematical
facts, like 2 + 2 = 4, would still be required to explain why
mathematical ability is selectively advantageous. Many of
our mathematical beliefs are adaptive because they are
true. The idea is to give the same sort of account for moral
beliefs: they are selectively advantageous because they
are true. Selective advantage and moral status can, however,
come apart in some instances. One can imagine a
context in which it would be selectively advantageous for
men to rape women. In such a context, it might be selectively
advantageous to have the belief that rape is morally
permissible. Rape would, however, remain morally reprehensible
and repugnant even if it were selectively advantageous
to believe otherwise.
Even if there is a tension between ethical nativism and
moral realism, the tension might not be so serious if only a
few of our ethical beliefs are in fact innate. Many of our ethical
beliefs come from and are justified by a reflective process
that involves feedback among our various ethical
286 Ethnopsychology
beliefs; this suggests that many of them are not innate. The
nativist argument against moral realism depends on the
strength of its empirical premises.
See also ADAPTATION AND ADAPTATIONISM; CULTURAL
EVOLUTION; CULTURAL VARIATION; EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY;
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
—Edward Stein
References
Brink, D. O. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de Waal, F. (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and
Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.There is increasing evidence that the human brain comes
prewired for a wide range of specialized capacities (see
NATIVISM and DOMAIN SPECIFICITY). With regard to ethics,
the central questions are to what extent the human brain is
prewired for ethical thinking and, insofar as it is, what the
implications of this are.
There is one sense in which humans are prewired for ethics:
humans have the capacity for ethical reasoning and
reflection while amoebas do not. This human capacity is
biologically based and results from EVOLUTION. Ethical
nativism is the view that there are specific, prewired mechanisms
for ethical thought. Adherents of SOCIOBIOLOGY, the
view that evolutionary theory can explain all human social
behavior, are among those who embrace ethical nativism. E.
O. Wilson, in Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), goes
so far as to say that ethics can be “biologized.” Sociobiologists
claim that humans have specific ethical beliefs and an
associated ethical framework that are innate and are the
result of natural selection. They support this view with evidence
that humans in all cultures share certain ethical
beliefs and certain underlying ethical principles (see HUMAN
UNIVERSALS), evidence of ethical or “pre-ethical” behavior
among other mammals, especially primates (see de Waal
1996), and with evolutionary accounts of the selective
advantage of having innate ethical mental mechanisms.
Most notably, they talk about the selective advantage (to the
individual or to the species) of ALTRUISM.
Consider a particular moral belief or feeling for which an
evolutionary explanation has been offered, namely the belief
that it is wrong to have (consensual) sex with one’s sibling.
Some sociobiologists have argued that this belief (more precisely,
the feeling that there is something wrong about having
sex with a person one was raised with) is innate and that
we have this belief because of its selective advantage. When
close blood relatives reproduce, there is a relatively high
chance that traits carried on recessive genes (most notably,
serious diseases like sickle-cell anemia and hemophilia) will
be exhibited in the resulting offspring. Such offspring are
thus more likely to fail to reproduce. Engaging in incest is
thus an evolutionarily nonadaptive strategy. If a mutation
occurred that caused an organism to feel or believe that it is
wrong to engage in incest, then, all else being equal, this
gene would spread through the population over subsequent
generations. Sociobiologists think they can give similar
accounts of our other ethical beliefs and the mechanisms
that underlie them.
What are the implications for ethics if ethical nativism
and some version of the sociobiological story behind it are
true? Some philosophers have denied there are any interesting
implications. Ethics, they note, is normative (it says
what we ought to do), whereas biology—in particular, the
details of the evolutionary origins of humans and our various
capacities—is descriptive. One cannot derive normative
conclusions from empirical premises. To do so is to commit
the naturalistic fallacy. It would be a mistake, for example,
to infer from the empirical premise that our teeth evolved
for tearing flesh to the normative conclusions that we ought
to eat meat. This empirical premise is compatible with ethical
arguments that it is morally wrong to eat meat. By the
same reasoning, the fact that evolution produced in us the
tendency to have some moral feeling or belief does not necessarily
entail that we ought to act on that feeling or accept
that belief on reflection. In fact, some commentators have
suggested, following Thomas Huxley (1894), that “the ethical
progress of society depends, not on imitating [biological
evolution], . . . but in combating it.”
Ethical nativists have various responses to the charge that
they commit the naturalistic fallacy. Some allow that the fact
that humans have some innate moral belief does not entail
that we ought to act on it, while insisting that nativism has
something to tell us about ethics. Perhaps biology can tell us
that we are not able to do certain things and thus that it cannot
be the case that we ought to do this. For example, concerning
feminism, some sociobiologists have claimed that
many of the differences between men and women are biologically
based and unchangeable; a feminist political
agenda that strives for equality is therefore destined to failure.
This argument has been criticized on both empirical
and normative grounds (see Kitcher 1985 and Fausto-
Sterling 1992).
Some sociobiologists (Wilson 1975 and Ruse 1986) have
argued that the facts of human evolution have implications
for moral realism, the metaethical position that there are
moral facts like, for example, the moral fact that it is wrong
to torture babies for fun. A standard argument for moral
realism says that the existence of moral facts explains the
fact that we have moral beliefs (on moral realism, see Harman
1977; Mackie 1977; Brink 1989). If, however, ethical
nativism is true and an evolutionary account can be given
for why people have the moral beliefs they do, then an
empirical explanation can be given for why we have the ethical
capacities that we do. The standard argument for moral
realism is thus undercut.
One promising reply to this line of thought is to note
that moral facts might be involved in giving a biological
account of why we humans have the moral beliefs that we
do. In the case of incest, the moral status of incest might
be related to the selective advantageousness of incest.
Consider an analogy to mathematics. Although we might
give an evolutionary explanation of the spread of mathematical
abilities in humans (say, because the ability to
perform addition was useful for hunting), mathematical
facts, like 2 + 2 = 4, would still be required to explain why
mathematical ability is selectively advantageous. Many of
our mathematical beliefs are adaptive because they are
true. The idea is to give the same sort of account for moral
beliefs: they are selectively advantageous because they
are true. Selective advantage and moral status can, however,
come apart in some instances. One can imagine a
context in which it would be selectively advantageous for
men to rape women. In such a context, it might be selectively
advantageous to have the belief that rape is morally
permissible. Rape would, however, remain morally reprehensible
and repugnant even if it were selectively advantageous
to believe otherwise.
Even if there is a tension between ethical nativism and
moral realism, the tension might not be so serious if only a
few of our ethical beliefs are in fact innate. Many of our ethical
beliefs come from and are justified by a reflective process
that involves feedback among our various ethical
286 Ethnopsychology
beliefs; this suggests that many of them are not innate. The
nativist argument against moral realism depends on the
strength of its empirical premises.
See also ADAPTATION AND ADAPTATIONISM; CULTURAL
EVOLUTION; CULTURAL VARIATION; EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY;
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
—Edward Stein
References
Brink, D. O. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de Waal, F. (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and
Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1992). Myths of Gender: Biological Theories
about Women and Men. Rev. ed. New York: Basic Books.
Harman, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Huxley, T. H. (1894). Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays. New
York: D. Appleton.
Kitcher, P. (1985). Vaulting Ambition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New
York: Penguin.
Ruse, M. (1986). Taking Darwin Seriously. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Further Readings
Bradie, M. (1994). The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Goldman, A. (1993). Ethics and cognitive science. Ethics 103:
337–360.
Lumsden, C., and E. O. Wilson. (1981). Genes, Minds and Culture.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nitecki, M., and D. Nitecki, Eds. (1993). Evolutionary Ethics.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Thompson, P., Ed. (1995). Issues in Evolutionary Ethics. Albany:
SUNY Press.

Fausto-Sterling, A. (1992). Myths of Gender: Biological Theories
about Women and Men. Rev. ed. New York: Basic Books.
Harman, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Huxley, T. H. (1894). Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays. New
York: D. Appleton.
Kitcher, P. (1985). Vaulting Ambition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New
York: Penguin.
Ruse, M. (1986). Taking Darwin Seriously. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Further Readings
Bradie, M. (1994). The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Goldman, A. (1993). Ethics and cognitive science. Ethics 103:
337–360.
Lumsden, C., and E. O. Wilson. (1981). Genes, Minds and Culture.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nitecki, M., and D. Nitecki, Eds. (1993). Evolutionary Ethics.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Thompson, P., Ed. (1995). Issues in Evolutionary Ethics. Albany:
SUNY Press.



Cultural Relativism
How are we to make sense of the diversity of beliefs and
ethical values documented by anthropology’s ethnographic
record? Cultural relativism infers from this record that significant
dimensions of human experience, including morality
and ethics, are inherently local and variable rather than
universal. Most relativists (with the exception of developmental
relativists discussed below) interpret and evaluate
214 Cultural Relativism
such diverse beliefs and practices in relation to local cultural
frameworks rather than universal principles.
There are many variations on the theme of cultural relativism.
Six important variants are described below:
1. Epistemological relativism, the most general phrasing
of cultural relativism, proposes that human experience is
mediated by local frameworks for knowledge (Geertz
1973). Most epistemological relativism assumes that experienced
reality is largely a social and cultural construction and
so this position is often called “social constructionism”
(Berger and Luckmann 1966).
2. Logical relativism claims that there are no transcultural
and universal principles of rationality, logic and reasoning.
This claim was debated in the 1970s in a series of
publications featuring debates among English philosophers,
anthropologists, and sociologists about the nature and universality
of rationality in logical and moral judgment (B.
Wilson 1970).
3. Historical relativism views historical eras as a cultural
and intellectual history of diverse and changing ideas,
paradigms, or worldviews (Burckhardt 1943; Kuhn 1977).
4. Linguistic relativism focuses on the effects of particular
grammatical and lexical forms on habitual thinking and
classification (Whorf 1956; Lucy 1992).
5. Ethical relativism claims that behavior can be morally
evaluated only in relation to a local framework of values
and beliefs rather than universal ethical norms (Ladd
1953). Proponents advocate tolerance in ethical judgments
to counter the presumed ethnocentricism of universalistic
judgments (Herskovitz 1972; Hatch 1983). Opponents
claim that extreme ethical relativism is amoral and potentially
immoral since it can justify, by an appeal to local or
historical context, any action, including acts like genocide
that most people would condemn (Vivas 1950; Norris
1996). This debate engages the highly visible discourse on
the doctrine of universal human rights, and the extent to
which it reflects natural rights rather than the cultural values
of a politically dominant community (R. Wilson 1997).
Important and emotionally salient issues engaged in this
debate include the status of women, abortion, religious tolerance,
the treatment of children, arranged marriages,
female circumcision, and capital punishment. A common
thread linking many of these issues is the status of “the
individual” and by implication social equality versus social
hierarchy, and cultural relativism can be used to justify
relations of inequality (Dumont 1970).
6. Distinct from evolutionary psychologists mentioned
above are developmental relativists who ascribe differences
in thought or values to different stages of human development,
either in terms of evolutionary stages or developmental
differences in moral reasoning between individuals. A
commonplace assumption of Victorian anthropology, evolutionism
still has echoes in the genetic epistemology of
developmental psychologists like PIAGET, Kohlberg, and
Werner (Piaget 1932; Kohlberg 1981, 1983; Werner 1948/
1964). Genetic epistemology acknowledges the cultural
diversity and relativity of systems of reasoning and symbolism
but links these differences to a universalistic developmental
(and, by common implication, evolutionary)
trajectory.
Both a philosophical and a moral stance, cultural relativism
makes two different sorts of claims: (1) an ontological
claim about the nature of human understanding, a claim
subject to empirical testing and verification, and (2) a
moral/political claim advocating tolerance of divergent cultural
styles of thought and action.
Cultural relativism implies a fundamental human psychic
diversity. Such diversity need not preclude important universals
of thought and feeling. Relativism and universalism
are often seen as mutually exclusive. At the relativist end of
the spectrum are proponents of CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
who argue that the very categories and processes by which
psychologists understand the person are themselves cultural
constructs, and who imply that academic psychology is
actually a Western ETHNOPSYCHOLOGY (Shweder 1989).
From this perspective comparative or cross-cultural psychology
become impossible, inasmuch as the psychology of
each community would need to be studied in its own analytical
terms. At the universalist end of the spectrum is EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY, which looks at human cognitive
architecture as having evolved largely during the upper
Paleolithic, subject to the general Darwinian forces of natural
selection and fitness maximization (Barkow, Cosmides,
and Tooby 1992). Local cultural differences are viewed as
relatively trivial compared with the shared cognitive abilities
that are the products of hominid evolution.
Many cognitive anthropologists see in the relativist/universalist
distinction a false dichotomy. An adequate model
of mind must encompass both universal and variable properties.
Although they acknowledge the importance of a shared
basic cognitive architecture and universal process of both
information processing and meaning construction, many
cognitive anthropologists do not see cultural variation as
trivial but stress the crucial mediating roles of diverse social
environments and variable cultural models in human cognition
(D’Andrade 1987; Holland and Quinn 1987; Hutchins
1996; Shore 1996).
Although cultural relativism has rarely been treated as a
problem of cognitive science, COGNITIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
is a useful perspective for reframing the issues of cultural
relativism. For cognitive anthropologists, a cultural unit
comprises a population sharing a large and diverse stock of
cultural models, which differ from community to community.
Once internalized, cultural models become conventional
cognitive models in individual minds. Cultural
models thus have a double life as both instituted models
(public institutions) and conventional mental models (individuals’
mental representations of public forms; Shore
1996). Other kinds of cognitive models include “hardwired”
schemas (like those governing facial recognition)
and personal/idiosyncratic mental models that differ from
person to person. Thus viewed, culture is not a bounded
unit but a dynamic social distribution of instituted and
mental models.
When culture is conceived as a socially distributed system
of models, the sources of cultural relativity become
more complex and subtle but are easier to specify. Rather
than draw simple oppositions between distinct cultures, we
can specify which models (rather than which cultures) are
different and how they differ. Thus the similarity or differCultural
Relativism 215
ence between communities is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon,
but is a matter of particular differences or similarities.
In addition, significant conflict or contradiction among
cultural models within a community becomes easier to
account for, as do conflicts between cultural models and
personal models or between cultural models and relatively
unmodeled (diffuse/inarticulate) feelings and desires. Such
internal conflicts do not argue against the intersubjective
sharing of cultural models within a community or the
important difference between communities. But they suggest
a softening of the oppositions between discrete cultures
that has been the hallmark of much of the discourse of cultural
relativism.
Many within-culture conflicts suggest existential dilemmas
that have no final resolution (e.g., autonomy versus
dependency needs, equality and hierarchy; Fiske 1990;
Nuckolls 1997). There are models and countermodels, as in
political discourse. Cultural models sometimes provide temporary
resolutions, serving as salient cognitive and emotional
resources for clarifying experience. Sometimes, as in
religious ritual, cultural models simply crystallize contradictions,
representing them as sacred paradox. Such resolutions
are never complete, and never exhaust the experience
of individuals. In this way, the relativity between cultures is
complemented by a degree of experiential relativity within
cultures (variation and conflict) and periodically within
individuals (ambivalence).
See also COLOR CATEGORIZATION; CULTURAL SYMBOLISM;
CULTURAL VARIATION; LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY
HYPOTHESIS; MOTIVATION AND CULTURE; SAPIR, EDWARD
—Bradd Shore
References
Barkow H., L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby, Eds. (1992). The Adapted
Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Berger, P., and T. Luckmann. (1966). The Social Construction of
Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden
City: Doubleday.
Burckhardt, J. (1943). Reflections on History. Trans. M. D. Hottinger.
London: G. Allen and Unwin.
D’Andrade, R. (1987). Cultural meaning systems. In R. Shweder
and R. LeVine, Eds., Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self
and Emotion, pp. 88–119. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Dumont, L. (1970). Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Fiske, A. P. (1990). Relativity within Moose (”Mossi”) culture:
four incommensurable models for social relationships. Ethos
18(2): 180–204.
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic
Books.
Hatch, E. (1983). Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in
Anthropology. New York: Columbia University Press.
Herskovitz, M. J. (1972). Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural
Pluralism. New York: Random House.
Holland, D., and N. Quinn, Eds. (1987). Cultural Models in Language
and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hutchins, E. (1996). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays in Moral Development, vol. 1: The
Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper and
Row.
Kohlberg, L. (1983). Essays in Moral Development, vol. 2: The
Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper and
Row.
Kuhn, T. (1977). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ladd, J. (1953). Ethical Relativism. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Lucy, J. (1992). Language Diversity and Thought: A Reformulation
of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Nuckolls, C. (1997). Culture and the Dialectics of Desire. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press.
Piaget, J. (1932). The Development of Moral Reasoning in Children.
New York: Free Press.
Shore, B. (1996). Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture and the
Problem of Meaning. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shweder, R. (1989). Cultural psychology: what is it? In J. Stigler,
R. Shweder, and G. Herdt, Eds., Cultural Psychology: The Chicago
Symposia on Culture and Development. New York: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 1–46.
Vivas, E. (1950). The Moral Life and the Ethical Life. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Werner, H. (1948/1964). Comparative Psychology of Mental
Development. Rev. ed. New York: International University
Press.
Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Wilson, B., Ed. (1970). Rationality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wilson, R., Ed. (1997). Human Rights, Cultural Context:
Anthropological Perspectives. London and Chicago: Pluto
Press.
Further Readings
Benedict, R. (1934). Patterns of Culture. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Fernandez, J. (1990). Tolerance in a repugnant world and other
dilemmas of cultural relativism in the work of Melville J. Herskovitz.
Ethos 18(2): 140–164.
Geertz, C. (1984). Distinguished lecture: anti-anti relativism.
American Anthropologist 86(2): 263–278.
Hartung, F. E. (1954). Cultural relativity and moral judgments.
Philosophy of Science 21: 118–126.
Horton, R. (1967). African traditional thought and Western science.
Africa 37: 50–71, 155–187.
Lucy, J. (1985). Whorf’s view of the linguistic mediation of
thought. In E. Mertz and R. Parmentier, Eds., Semiotic Mediation:
Sociological and Psychological Perspectives. Orlando,
FL: Academic Press, pp. 73–98.
Norris, C. (1996). Reclaiming Truth: Contribution to a Critique of
Cultural Relativism. Durham: Duke University Press.
Overing, J., Ed. (1985). Reason and Morality. London: Tavistock.
Schoeck, H., and J. M. Wiggens. (1961). Relativism and the Study
of Man. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.
Shweder, R. (1990). Ethical relativism: is there a defensible version?
Ethos 18(2): 205–218.
Shweder, R., M. Mahapatra, and J. G. Miller. (1987). Culture and
moral development. In J. Kagan and S. Lamb, Eds., The Emergence
of Morality in Young Children. Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, pp. 1–90.
Spiro, M. (1986). Cultural relativism and the future of anthropology.
Cultural Anthropology 1(3): 259




Moral Psychology
Moral psychology is a branch of ethics. It concerns the features
of human psychology whose study is necessary to the
examination of the main questions of ethics, questions about
what is inherently valuable, what constitutes human wellbeing,
and what justice and decency toward others demand.
Adequate examination of these questions requires an understanding
of the primary motives of human behavior, the
sources of pleasure and pain in human life, the capacity
humans have for voluntary action, and the nature of such
psychological states and processes as desire, emotion, conscience,
deliberation, choice, character or personality, and
volition. The study of these phenomena in relation to the
main questions of ethics defines the field of moral psychology.
At the heart of this study are questions about the intellectual
and emotional capacities in virtue of which human
beings qualify as moral agents. Humans, in being capable of
moral agency, differ from all other animals. This difference
explains why human action, unlike the actions of other animals,
is subject to moral assessment and why humans,
unlike other animals, are morally responsible for their
actions. At the same time, not every human being is morally
responsible for his or her actions. Some like the very young
and the utterly demented are not. They lack the capacities
that a person must have to be morally responsible, capacities
that equip people for understanding the moral quality of
their actions and for being motivated to act accordingly. Full
possession of these capacities is what qualifies a person as a
moral agent, and it is the business of moral psychology to
specify what they are and to determine what full possession
of them consists in.
In modern ethics the study of these questions has largely
concentrated on the role and importance of reason in moral
thought and moral motivation. The overarching issue is
whether reason alone, if fully developed and unimpaired, is
sufficient for moral agency, and the field divides into affirmative
and negative positions on this issue. Rationalist philosophers,
among whom KANT is foremost in the modern
period, defend the former. On their view, reason works not
only to instruct one about the moral quality of one’s actions
but also to produce motivation to act morally. Human
beings, on this view, are moved by two fundamental kinds
of desire, rational and nonrational. Rational desires have
their source in the operations of reason, nonrational in animal
appetite and passion. Accordingly, moral motivation,
on this position, is a species of rational desire, and reason
not only produces such desire but is also capable of investing
it with enough strength to suppress the conflicting
impulses of appetite and passion. Moral agency in human
beings thus consists in the governance of appetite and passion
by reason, and the possession of reason is therefore
alone ordinarily sufficient to make one responsible for one’s
actions.
The chief opposition to this view comes from philosophers
such as HUME and Mill. They deny that reason is ever
the source of moral motivation and restrict its role in moral
agency to instructing one about the moral quality of one’s
actions. On this view, all desires originate in animal appetite
and passion, and reason works in the service of these desires
to produce intelligent action, action that is well aimed for
attaining the objects of the desires it serves. Consequently,
the primary forms of moral motivation, on this position, the
desire to act rightly, the aversion to acting wrongly, are not
products of reason but are instead acquired through some
mechanical process of socialization by which their objects
become associated with the objects of natural desires and
aversions. Moral agency in human beings thus consists in
cooperation among several forces, including reason, but also
including a desire to act rightly and an aversion to acting
wrongly that originate in natural desires and aversions.
Hence, because the acquisition of these desires and aversions
is not guaranteed by the maturation of reason, the possession
of reason is never alone sufficient to make one
responsible for one’s actions.
This anti-rationalist view is typically inspired by, when
not grounded in, the methods and theories of natural science
as applied to human psychology. In this regard, the most
influential elaboration of the view in twentieth century
thought is Freud’s. Applying the general principles of personality
development central to his mature theory, FREUD
gave an account of the child's development of a conscience
and a sense of guilt that explained the independence and
seeming authority of these phenomena consistently with
their originating in emotions and drives that humans like
other animals possess innately. His account in this way
speaks directly to the challenge that the rationalist view represents,
for rationalists, such as Kant, make the independence
and seeming authority of conscience the basis for
attributing the phenomena of conscience, including their
motivational force, to the operations of reason.
A second dispute between rationalists and their opponents
concerns the nature of moral thought. Rationalists
hold that moral thought at its foundations is intelligible
independently of all sensory and affective experiences. It is,
in this respect, like arithmetic thought at its foundations.
Kant’s view again sets the standard. In brief, it is that the
concepts and principles constitutive of moral thought are
562 Morphology
formal and universal, that their application defines an attitude
of impartiality toward oneself and others, and that
through their realization in action, that is, by following the
judgments one makes in applying them, one achieves a certain
kind of freedom, which Kant called autonomy. This
view, unlike Kant’s view about moral motivation, which has
little currency outside of philosophy, deeply informs various
programs in contemporary developmental psychology, notably
those of PIAGET and his followers, whose work on moral
judgment and its development draws heavily on the formalist
and universalist elements in Kant’s ethics.
Opponents of this view maintain that some moral
thought is embodied by or founded on certain affective
experiences. In this respect they follow common opinion.
Sympathy, compassion, love, humanity, and attitudes of caring
and friendship are commonly regarded as moral
responses, and in the views of leading anti-rationalist thinkers
one or another of these responses is treated as fundamental
to ethics. Accordingly, the cognitions that each
embodies or the beliefs about human needs and well-being
(or the needs and well-being of other animals) that each presupposes
and to which each gives force count on these
views as forms of foundational moral thought. Such
thought, in contrast to the rationalist conception, is not
resolvable into formal concepts and principles, does not
necessarily reflect an attitude of impartiality toward oneself
and others, and brings through its realization, not autonomy,
but connection with others. In contemporary developmental
psychology, this view finds support in work on gender differences
in moral thinking and on the origins of such thinking
in the child’s capacity for empathy.
—John Deigh
References
Eisenberg, N., and J. Strayer, Eds. (1987). Empathy and Its Development.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Freud, S. (1923). The Ego and the Id. New York: Norton.
Freud, S. (1931). Civilization and Its Discontents. New York:
Norton.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory
and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Hume, D. (1751). Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
Indianapolis: Hackett.
Kant, I. (1788). Critique of Practical Reason. Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on Moral Development, vol. 1. San
Francisco: Harper and Row.
Mill, J. S. (1861). Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Nagel, T. (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child. New York:
Free Press.
Further Readings
Blum, L. A. (1995). Moral Perception and Particularity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Deigh, J. (1992). Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Deigh, J. (1996). The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral
Psychology and Freudian Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Dillon, R. S., Ed. (1995). Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
New York: Routledge.
Flanagan, O. (1991). Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and
Psychological Realism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Flanagan, O., and A. Rorty, Eds. (1990). Identity Character and
Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Hoffman, M. L. (1982). Development of prosocial motivation:
Empathy and guilt. In N. Eisenberg, Ed., The Development of
Prosocial Behavior. New York: Academic Press, pp. 281–
313.
Johnson, M. (1993). Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive
Science for Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
May, L., M. Friedman, and A. Clark, Eds. (1996). Mind and Morals:
Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Morris, H. (1976). On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Theory
and Moral Psychology. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Rorty, A. (1988). Mind in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of
Mind. Boston: Beacon Press.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1763). Émile. New York: Basic Books.
Schoeman, F., Ed. (1988). Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions:
New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Stocker, M. (1990). Plural and Conflicting Values. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Stocker, M. (1996). Valuing Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of
the British Academy 48: 1–25.
Taylor, G. (1985). Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-
Assessment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomas, L. (1989). Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Williams, B. (1981). Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Williams, B. (1993). Shame and Necessity. Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Wollheim, R. (1984). The Thread of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Wollheim, R. (1993). The Mind and its Depths. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.

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poesie + pensieri di un anarchico (scusate la presunzione) by lametta Sunday, Mar. 05, 2006 at 8:13 PM mail: <mailto:>
VE AMO

studiate o gente mia
ma no solo alla scola
soprattutto nella vita
perche de coionate er monno e pieno
e a noi tutti c'aritorna sto veleno
percio fate come er krisna murti
che a nessuno venne la sua pace
perche e sua e sola ed e infinita
(per chi non lo sapesse krisnamurti era un pacifista che ha vissuto fra le grandi guerre e merita di capirne il pensiero semplice ma efficace.)



NUN SO NIENTE

legge ste poesie se cosi possiamo di
certo po quasi offenne
se'n sei de roma certo n'ce poi capi proprio niente
e poi n'te dico sta punteggiatura cosi evidente
che quasi sembra confonnese co sta gente
gente de roma sii bona e irriverente
che pero e pure de na parola sola
il resto nun so niente
e daie sogna famme ride
che li sogni tua so na smartita
d'amor e confusione
come se ce fosse ancora na crocifissione


Ultimamente leggo molti scritti che confermano un pensiero diffuso che rispecchia una forte contraddizione sociale.
Quando si parla di essere selvaggi si dimentica con troppa facilita:
1) lo studio delle culture indigene
2) di esplicitare che molte teorie che riempiono la bocca di filosofi sono basate sulle frustrazioni e non su un approfondimento reale e multidisciplinare delle realtà descritte.
3) Attenzione alla demagogia soggiogata ad interessi

L’essere umano e un animale sociale che tende verso la legge del minimo sforzo come migliore adattatività al contesto nel quale e contenuto e cio lo ottiene, appunto, attraverso processi costruttivi nuovi ma che ricalcano la natura (noi non inventiamo nulla di nuovo ma rielaboriamo l’esistente ed in primo luogo la natura, ed è questo il motivo per il quale la biodiversita ecologica è la prima ricchezza).
In questo vi è la giustificazione del lavoro di gruppo che troverete, anche, in qualsiasi realtà indigena.
L’essere umano non è un virus ma una forma adattativi del sistema naturale che a causa della natura violenta di stampo egemonico o di potere cerca di sottomettere per dimostrare la propria superiorità evitando di porsi domande che fanno paura.
Queste domande che fanno paura sorgono da cause diverse e ci hanno portato ad uno pseudosviluppo autodistruttivo che poi applichiamo, in modo meccanico ed insensato, anche nei rapporti con gli altri.
Ovviamente in questo si puo trovare una affinita con il concetto di virus come semplificazione simbolica ma è proprio tale semplificazione o meglio il simbolismo stesso il peggior nemico della presa soggettiva di coscienza che costa fatica e volontà ma nello stesso tempo e il primo passo per raggiungere tale coscienza se si fga un lavoro di approfondimento.
In questo modo d’immagine cosa ci si deve aspettare se non questo dalla maggior parte delle persone.
Per concludere un virus è un agente che determina profonde trasformazioni alla vita ed è la prima forma di vita che ha fatto sviluppare tutte le altre forme quindi è in realtà un agente positivo al rinnovamento dell’esistente in forme sempre più evolute.
Vorrei finire dicendo che in questo periodo elettorale gia intravedo pratiche di demistificazione e di diffamazione.
Aggiungerei che la logica del distruggere per ricostruire è il primo nemico di un reale cambiamento in orizzontale e trasversale proprio perché nasce dalle stesse logiche che ci hanno condotto a questo processo autodistruttivo di cui vi dicevo sopra.
La domando che mi sorge è a chi giova? La risposta che io trovo a tutti coloro che hanno creato questa merda che molti come me cercano di destrutturate perché cosi possono evitare di farsi carico delle proprie responsabilità.

In ultimo bisogna stare attenti alle facili strumentalizzazioni che si cercano di fare del pensiero anarchico perché in questa fase oltre all’università fanno paura anche loro, quindi ci sono molti soggetti che cercano di catturarne lo spirito per poi riutilizzarlo per fini a loro più convenevoli e che non necessariamente sono predefiniti ma potrebbero variare in funzione delle condizioni.

Vi aggiungo:

Sull'individualismo Anarchico

by L'individualista Anarchico Sunday, Mar. 05, 2006 at 5:30
la morale e una merda proprio perche si inquadra in una struttura sovradeterminata che tu giustamente chiami stato.
A me personalmenmte piace l'etica.
Se oltre a testi filosofici approfondissi su quelli antropologici potresti conprendere che l'essere umano come animale sociale tende alla ricerca di altri individui che possano in qualche modo condividere scelte e motivazioni.
Quando fai una scelta e la condividi ti basi su di un presupposto di fiducia e rispetto della diversita che pero, eticamente cercherai di non calpestare.
In questa societa dove la disgregazione e al suo apice queste forme minime di etica sociale sono lasciate al tempo che trovano proprio perchè le influenze della morale sono talmente ed abilmente costruite che ne diveniamo schiavi senza rendercene conto.
Potrei dirti che se la tua etica è della non etica ti posso accettare ma il tuo sarebbe un rapporto eticamente corretto nei miei confronti.
Il problema e che gli individui come complessita manipolabile sono troppo spesso utilizzati a loro insaputa per motivi di cui loro stessi sono ignari.
Mi sento anarchico, sono individualista, non sopporto la morale ma cerco una chiave etica umana di rispetto e sopravvivenza con l'altro e se l'altro mi tradisce, quando la nostra relazione è esplicitata, m'incazzo.
Nascondersi dietyro ad un dito per evitare di prendersi le proprie responsabilita non è un atteggiamento che definisco anarchico ma di vile e paraculo.
Personalmente la mia ricerca è interdisciplinare e non si basa solo su testi di filosofia proprio perchè sono cosciente delle diversita e del valore individuale o se vuoi dell'Osservatore hamiltoniano.
Certe volte molti bei discorsi forbiti e motivati da bei nomi famosi si riducono ad un nozionissmo settoriale e comodo che difende se stesso come un gruppo da coloro che non la pensano nello stesso modo (sociologia).
Ti faccio un esempio: sto con una ragazza con il quale determino un etica esplicita e poi colei a cui difendo l'esistenza distrugge la mia con comportamenti vili e di rivincita.
Mi incazzo e cerco di capire se gli sono stati indotti da una morale o da pressioni di diverso tipo psicologiche e subliminali od ancora se mi vuole fottere perchè sta li per questo coscientemente e poi reaggisco e ti assicuro non sono tenero tanto quanto la controparte.
L'anarchia è una presa di coscienza continua e difficile che non dovrebbe lasciare spazio alla semplificazione di comodo perche cosi si fa la morale che puo essere chiamata anche "anarchia" nel senso che oggigiorno il potere prende tutte le parole e le trasforma in mode e utili.
In conclusione chi dice che gli anarchico/a rifiuta la morale puo essere vero e lo è sicuramente in contesto come quello attuale ma che un anarchico/a non abbia etica e rispetto di coloro con cui vive il proprio esistere e una morale costruita e l'unica via per un anarchico/a e quella dell'etica e della capacita di confronto dove le idee trovano i loro spazi inevitabilmente.