Scusate l'ho erroneamente mandato su indymedia italy se potete toglietelo da li. by lametta Monday, Mar. 06, 2006 at 6:45 PM mail:
vorrei prima di tutto inserire questa lettura ( in inglese )che non ho letto completamente ma conosco nel merito, dopo vi lascio un articolo che ho anche pubblicato in imc italy. Aggiungo che il primo nemico assoluto e la creazione di gerarchie accentranti rispetto al pensiero anarchico e di pacifisti che cito in una poesia nella lettura. Intendo dire che non so cosa sia il F.A.I. ma mi interessa il dialogo ed il confronto e non le strutture che siano dirigenziali (ripeto non conosco queste realta quindi il mio e solo un personalissimo preambolo e non una affermazione).
Ethics See CULTURAL RELATIVISM; ETHICS AND EVOLUTION; MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Ethics and Evolution When Charles DARWIN wrote The Origin of Species, he withheld discussion of the origins of human morality and cognition. Despite Darwin’s restraint, some of the strongest reactions to the theory of natural selection had to do with its connection to ethical matters. The intersection between evolution and ethics continues to be a site of controversy. Some claim that human ethical judgments are to be explained by their adaptive value. Others claim that human ethical systems are the result of cultural evolution, not biological evolution. In the context of cognitive science, the central issue is whether humans have ethics-specific beliefs or cognitive mechanisms that are the result of biological evolution. There is increasing evidence that the human brain comes prewired for a wide range of specialized capacities (see NATIVISM and DOMAIN SPECIFICITY). With regard to ethics, the central questions are to what extent the human brain is prewired for ethical thinking and, insofar as it is, what the implications of this are. There is one sense in which humans are prewired for ethics: humans have the capacity for ethical reasoning and reflection while amoebas do not. This human capacity is biologically based and results from EVOLUTION. Ethical nativism is the view that there are specific, prewired mechanisms for ethical thought. Adherents of SOCIOBIOLOGY, the view that evolutionary theory can explain all human social behavior, are among those who embrace ethical nativism. E. O. Wilson, in Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), goes so far as to say that ethics can be “biologized.” Sociobiologists claim that humans have specific ethical beliefs and an associated ethical framework that are innate and are the result of natural selection. They support this view with evidence that humans in all cultures share certain ethical beliefs and certain underlying ethical principles (see HUMAN UNIVERSALS), evidence of ethical or “pre-ethical” behavior among other mammals, especially primates (see de Waal 1996), and with evolutionary accounts of the selective advantage of having innate ethical mental mechanisms. Most notably, they talk about the selective advantage (to the individual or to the species) of ALTRUISM. Consider a particular moral belief or feeling for which an evolutionary explanation has been offered, namely the belief that it is wrong to have (consensual) sex with one’s sibling. Some sociobiologists have argued that this belief (more precisely, the feeling that there is something wrong about having sex with a person one was raised with) is innate and that we have this belief because of its selective advantage. When close blood relatives reproduce, there is a relatively high chance that traits carried on recessive genes (most notably, serious diseases like sickle-cell anemia and hemophilia) will be exhibited in the resulting offspring. Such offspring are thus more likely to fail to reproduce. Engaging in incest is thus an evolutionarily nonadaptive strategy. If a mutation occurred that caused an organism to feel or believe that it is wrong to engage in incest, then, all else being equal, this gene would spread through the population over subsequent generations. Sociobiologists think they can give similar accounts of our other ethical beliefs and the mechanisms that underlie them. What are the implications for ethics if ethical nativism and some version of the sociobiological story behind it are true? Some philosophers have denied there are any interesting implications. Ethics, they note, is normative (it says what we ought to do), whereas biology—in particular, the details of the evolutionary origins of humans and our various capacities—is descriptive. One cannot derive normative conclusions from empirical premises. To do so is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. It would be a mistake, for example, to infer from the empirical premise that our teeth evolved for tearing flesh to the normative conclusions that we ought to eat meat. This empirical premise is compatible with ethical arguments that it is morally wrong to eat meat. By the same reasoning, the fact that evolution produced in us the tendency to have some moral feeling or belief does not necessarily entail that we ought to act on that feeling or accept that belief on reflection. In fact, some commentators have suggested, following Thomas Huxley (1894), that “the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating [biological evolution], . . . but in combating it.” Ethical nativists have various responses to the charge that they commit the naturalistic fallacy. Some allow that the fact that humans have some innate moral belief does not entail that we ought to act on it, while insisting that nativism has something to tell us about ethics. Perhaps biology can tell us that we are not able to do certain things and thus that it cannot be the case that we ought to do this. For example, concerning feminism, some sociobiologists have claimed that many of the differences between men and women are biologically based and unchangeable; a feminist political agenda that strives for equality is therefore destined to failure. This argument has been criticized on both empirical and normative grounds (see Kitcher 1985 and Fausto- Sterling 1992). Some sociobiologists (Wilson 1975 and Ruse 1986) have argued that the facts of human evolution have implications for moral realism, the metaethical position that there are moral facts like, for example, the moral fact that it is wrong to torture babies for fun. A standard argument for moral realism says that the existence of moral facts explains the fact that we have moral beliefs (on moral realism, see Harman 1977; Mackie 1977; Brink 1989). If, however, ethical nativism is true and an evolutionary account can be given for why people have the moral beliefs they do, then an empirical explanation can be given for why we have the ethical capacities that we do. The standard argument for moral realism is thus undercut. One promising reply to this line of thought is to note that moral facts might be involved in giving a biological account of why we humans have the moral beliefs that we do. In the case of incest, the moral status of incest might be related to the selective advantageousness of incest. Consider an analogy to mathematics. Although we might give an evolutionary explanation of the spread of mathematical abilities in humans (say, because the ability to perform addition was useful for hunting), mathematical facts, like 2 + 2 = 4, would still be required to explain why mathematical ability is selectively advantageous. Many of our mathematical beliefs are adaptive because they are true. The idea is to give the same sort of account for moral beliefs: they are selectively advantageous because they are true. Selective advantage and moral status can, however, come apart in some instances. One can imagine a context in which it would be selectively advantageous for men to rape women. In such a context, it might be selectively advantageous to have the belief that rape is morally permissible. Rape would, however, remain morally reprehensible and repugnant even if it were selectively advantageous to believe otherwise. Even if there is a tension between ethical nativism and moral realism, the tension might not be so serious if only a few of our ethical beliefs are in fact innate. Many of our ethical beliefs come from and are justified by a reflective process that involves feedback among our various ethical 286 Ethnopsychology beliefs; this suggests that many of them are not innate. The nativist argument against moral realism depends on the strength of its empirical premises. See also ADAPTATION AND ADAPTATIONISM; CULTURAL EVOLUTION; CULTURAL VARIATION; EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY; MORAL PSYCHOLOGY —Edward Stein References Brink, D. O. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Waal, F. (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.There is increasing evidence that the human brain comes prewired for a wide range of specialized capacities (see NATIVISM and DOMAIN SPECIFICITY). With regard to ethics, the central questions are to what extent the human brain is prewired for ethical thinking and, insofar as it is, what the implications of this are. There is one sense in which humans are prewired for ethics: humans have the capacity for ethical reasoning and reflection while amoebas do not. This human capacity is biologically based and results from EVOLUTION. Ethical nativism is the view that there are specific, prewired mechanisms for ethical thought. Adherents of SOCIOBIOLOGY, the view that evolutionary theory can explain all human social behavior, are among those who embrace ethical nativism. E. O. Wilson, in Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), goes so far as to say that ethics can be “biologized.” Sociobiologists claim that humans have specific ethical beliefs and an associated ethical framework that are innate and are the result of natural selection. They support this view with evidence that humans in all cultures share certain ethical beliefs and certain underlying ethical principles (see HUMAN UNIVERSALS), evidence of ethical or “pre-ethical” behavior among other mammals, especially primates (see de Waal 1996), and with evolutionary accounts of the selective advantage of having innate ethical mental mechanisms. Most notably, they talk about the selective advantage (to the individual or to the species) of ALTRUISM. Consider a particular moral belief or feeling for which an evolutionary explanation has been offered, namely the belief that it is wrong to have (consensual) sex with one’s sibling. Some sociobiologists have argued that this belief (more precisely, the feeling that there is something wrong about having sex with a person one was raised with) is innate and that we have this belief because of its selective advantage. When close blood relatives reproduce, there is a relatively high chance that traits carried on recessive genes (most notably, serious diseases like sickle-cell anemia and hemophilia) will be exhibited in the resulting offspring. Such offspring are thus more likely to fail to reproduce. Engaging in incest is thus an evolutionarily nonadaptive strategy. If a mutation occurred that caused an organism to feel or believe that it is wrong to engage in incest, then, all else being equal, this gene would spread through the population over subsequent generations. Sociobiologists think they can give similar accounts of our other ethical beliefs and the mechanisms that underlie them. What are the implications for ethics if ethical nativism and some version of the sociobiological story behind it are true? Some philosophers have denied there are any interesting implications. Ethics, they note, is normative (it says what we ought to do), whereas biology—in particular, the details of the evolutionary origins of humans and our various capacities—is descriptive. One cannot derive normative conclusions from empirical premises. To do so is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. It would be a mistake, for example, to infer from the empirical premise that our teeth evolved for tearing flesh to the normative conclusions that we ought to eat meat. This empirical premise is compatible with ethical arguments that it is morally wrong to eat meat. By the same reasoning, the fact that evolution produced in us the tendency to have some moral feeling or belief does not necessarily entail that we ought to act on that feeling or accept that belief on reflection. In fact, some commentators have suggested, following Thomas Huxley (1894), that “the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating [biological evolution], . . . but in combating it.” Ethical nativists have various responses to the charge that they commit the naturalistic fallacy. Some allow that the fact that humans have some innate moral belief does not entail that we ought to act on it, while insisting that nativism has something to tell us about ethics. Perhaps biology can tell us that we are not able to do certain things and thus that it cannot be the case that we ought to do this. For example, concerning feminism, some sociobiologists have claimed that many of the differences between men and women are biologically based and unchangeable; a feminist political agenda that strives for equality is therefore destined to failure. This argument has been criticized on both empirical and normative grounds (see Kitcher 1985 and Fausto- Sterling 1992). Some sociobiologists (Wilson 1975 and Ruse 1986) have argued that the facts of human evolution have implications for moral realism, the metaethical position that there are moral facts like, for example, the moral fact that it is wrong to torture babies for fun. A standard argument for moral realism says that the existence of moral facts explains the fact that we have moral beliefs (on moral realism, see Harman 1977; Mackie 1977; Brink 1989). If, however, ethical nativism is true and an evolutionary account can be given for why people have the moral beliefs they do, then an empirical explanation can be given for why we have the ethical capacities that we do. The standard argument for moral realism is thus undercut. One promising reply to this line of thought is to note that moral facts might be involved in giving a biological account of why we humans have the moral beliefs that we do. In the case of incest, the moral status of incest might be related to the selective advantageousness of incest. Consider an analogy to mathematics. Although we might give an evolutionary explanation of the spread of mathematical abilities in humans (say, because the ability to perform addition was useful for hunting), mathematical facts, like 2 + 2 = 4, would still be required to explain why mathematical ability is selectively advantageous. Many of our mathematical beliefs are adaptive because they are true. The idea is to give the same sort of account for moral beliefs: they are selectively advantageous because they are true. Selective advantage and moral status can, however, come apart in some instances. One can imagine a context in which it would be selectively advantageous for men to rape women. In such a context, it might be selectively advantageous to have the belief that rape is morally permissible. Rape would, however, remain morally reprehensible and repugnant even if it were selectively advantageous to believe otherwise. Even if there is a tension between ethical nativism and moral realism, the tension might not be so serious if only a few of our ethical beliefs are in fact innate. Many of our ethical beliefs come from and are justified by a reflective process that involves feedback among our various ethical 286 Ethnopsychology beliefs; this suggests that many of them are not innate. The nativist argument against moral realism depends on the strength of its empirical premises. See also ADAPTATION AND ADAPTATIONISM; CULTURAL EVOLUTION; CULTURAL VARIATION; EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY; MORAL PSYCHOLOGY —Edward Stein References Brink, D. O. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Waal, F. (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Fausto-Sterling, A. (1992). Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men. Rev. ed. New York: Basic Books. Harman, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huxley, T. H. (1894). Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays. New York: D. Appleton. Kitcher, P. (1985). Vaulting Ambition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin. Ruse, M. (1986). Taking Darwin Seriously. Oxford: Blackwell. Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Further Readings Bradie, M. (1994). The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics. Albany: SUNY Press. Goldman, A. (1993). Ethics and cognitive science. Ethics 103: 337–360. Lumsden, C., and E. O. Wilson. (1981). Genes, Minds and Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nitecki, M., and D. Nitecki, Eds. (1993). Evolutionary Ethics. Albany: SUNY Press. Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Thompson, P., Ed. (1995). Issues in Evolutionary Ethics. Albany: SUNY Press.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (1992). Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men. Rev. ed. New York: Basic Books. Harman, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huxley, T. H. (1894). Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays. New York: D. Appleton. Kitcher, P. (1985). Vaulting Ambition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin. Ruse, M. (1986). Taking Darwin Seriously. Oxford: Blackwell. Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Further Readings Bradie, M. (1994). The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics. Albany: SUNY Press. Goldman, A. (1993). Ethics and cognitive science. Ethics 103: 337–360. Lumsden, C., and E. O. Wilson. (1981). Genes, Minds and Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nitecki, M., and D. Nitecki, Eds. (1993). Evolutionary Ethics. Albany: SUNY Press. Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Thompson, P., Ed. (1995). Issues in Evolutionary Ethics. Albany: SUNY Press.
Cultural Relativism How are we to make sense of the diversity of beliefs and ethical values documented by anthropology’s ethnographic record? Cultural relativism infers from this record that significant dimensions of human experience, including morality and ethics, are inherently local and variable rather than universal. Most relativists (with the exception of developmental relativists discussed below) interpret and evaluate 214 Cultural Relativism such diverse beliefs and practices in relation to local cultural frameworks rather than universal principles. There are many variations on the theme of cultural relativism. Six important variants are described below: 1. Epistemological relativism, the most general phrasing of cultural relativism, proposes that human experience is mediated by local frameworks for knowledge (Geertz 1973). Most epistemological relativism assumes that experienced reality is largely a social and cultural construction and so this position is often called “social constructionism” (Berger and Luckmann 1966). 2. Logical relativism claims that there are no transcultural and universal principles of rationality, logic and reasoning. This claim was debated in the 1970s in a series of publications featuring debates among English philosophers, anthropologists, and sociologists about the nature and universality of rationality in logical and moral judgment (B. Wilson 1970). 3. Historical relativism views historical eras as a cultural and intellectual history of diverse and changing ideas, paradigms, or worldviews (Burckhardt 1943; Kuhn 1977). 4. Linguistic relativism focuses on the effects of particular grammatical and lexical forms on habitual thinking and classification (Whorf 1956; Lucy 1992). 5. Ethical relativism claims that behavior can be morally evaluated only in relation to a local framework of values and beliefs rather than universal ethical norms (Ladd 1953). Proponents advocate tolerance in ethical judgments to counter the presumed ethnocentricism of universalistic judgments (Herskovitz 1972; Hatch 1983). Opponents claim that extreme ethical relativism is amoral and potentially immoral since it can justify, by an appeal to local or historical context, any action, including acts like genocide that most people would condemn (Vivas 1950; Norris 1996). This debate engages the highly visible discourse on the doctrine of universal human rights, and the extent to which it reflects natural rights rather than the cultural values of a politically dominant community (R. Wilson 1997). Important and emotionally salient issues engaged in this debate include the status of women, abortion, religious tolerance, the treatment of children, arranged marriages, female circumcision, and capital punishment. A common thread linking many of these issues is the status of “the individual” and by implication social equality versus social hierarchy, and cultural relativism can be used to justify relations of inequality (Dumont 1970). 6. Distinct from evolutionary psychologists mentioned above are developmental relativists who ascribe differences in thought or values to different stages of human development, either in terms of evolutionary stages or developmental differences in moral reasoning between individuals. A commonplace assumption of Victorian anthropology, evolutionism still has echoes in the genetic epistemology of developmental psychologists like PIAGET, Kohlberg, and Werner (Piaget 1932; Kohlberg 1981, 1983; Werner 1948/ 1964). Genetic epistemology acknowledges the cultural diversity and relativity of systems of reasoning and symbolism but links these differences to a universalistic developmental (and, by common implication, evolutionary) trajectory. Both a philosophical and a moral stance, cultural relativism makes two different sorts of claims: (1) an ontological claim about the nature of human understanding, a claim subject to empirical testing and verification, and (2) a moral/political claim advocating tolerance of divergent cultural styles of thought and action. Cultural relativism implies a fundamental human psychic diversity. Such diversity need not preclude important universals of thought and feeling. Relativism and universalism are often seen as mutually exclusive. At the relativist end of the spectrum are proponents of CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY who argue that the very categories and processes by which psychologists understand the person are themselves cultural constructs, and who imply that academic psychology is actually a Western ETHNOPSYCHOLOGY (Shweder 1989). From this perspective comparative or cross-cultural psychology become impossible, inasmuch as the psychology of each community would need to be studied in its own analytical terms. At the universalist end of the spectrum is EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, which looks at human cognitive architecture as having evolved largely during the upper Paleolithic, subject to the general Darwinian forces of natural selection and fitness maximization (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992). Local cultural differences are viewed as relatively trivial compared with the shared cognitive abilities that are the products of hominid evolution. Many cognitive anthropologists see in the relativist/universalist distinction a false dichotomy. An adequate model of mind must encompass both universal and variable properties. Although they acknowledge the importance of a shared basic cognitive architecture and universal process of both information processing and meaning construction, many cognitive anthropologists do not see cultural variation as trivial but stress the crucial mediating roles of diverse social environments and variable cultural models in human cognition (D’Andrade 1987; Holland and Quinn 1987; Hutchins 1996; Shore 1996). Although cultural relativism has rarely been treated as a problem of cognitive science, COGNITIVE ANTHROPOLOGY is a useful perspective for reframing the issues of cultural relativism. For cognitive anthropologists, a cultural unit comprises a population sharing a large and diverse stock of cultural models, which differ from community to community. Once internalized, cultural models become conventional cognitive models in individual minds. Cultural models thus have a double life as both instituted models (public institutions) and conventional mental models (individuals’ mental representations of public forms; Shore 1996). Other kinds of cognitive models include “hardwired” schemas (like those governing facial recognition) and personal/idiosyncratic mental models that differ from person to person. Thus viewed, culture is not a bounded unit but a dynamic social distribution of instituted and mental models. When culture is conceived as a socially distributed system of models, the sources of cultural relativity become more complex and subtle but are easier to specify. Rather than draw simple oppositions between distinct cultures, we can specify which models (rather than which cultures) are different and how they differ. Thus the similarity or differCultural Relativism 215 ence between communities is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but is a matter of particular differences or similarities. In addition, significant conflict or contradiction among cultural models within a community becomes easier to account for, as do conflicts between cultural models and personal models or between cultural models and relatively unmodeled (diffuse/inarticulate) feelings and desires. Such internal conflicts do not argue against the intersubjective sharing of cultural models within a community or the important difference between communities. But they suggest a softening of the oppositions between discrete cultures that has been the hallmark of much of the discourse of cultural relativism. Many within-culture conflicts suggest existential dilemmas that have no final resolution (e.g., autonomy versus dependency needs, equality and hierarchy; Fiske 1990; Nuckolls 1997). There are models and countermodels, as in political discourse. Cultural models sometimes provide temporary resolutions, serving as salient cognitive and emotional resources for clarifying experience. Sometimes, as in religious ritual, cultural models simply crystallize contradictions, representing them as sacred paradox. Such resolutions are never complete, and never exhaust the experience of individuals. In this way, the relativity between cultures is complemented by a degree of experiential relativity within cultures (variation and conflict) and periodically within individuals (ambivalence). See also COLOR CATEGORIZATION; CULTURAL SYMBOLISM; CULTURAL VARIATION; LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY HYPOTHESIS; MOTIVATION AND CULTURE; SAPIR, EDWARD —Bradd Shore References Barkow H., L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby, Eds. (1992). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Berger, P., and T. Luckmann. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City: Doubleday. Burckhardt, J. (1943). Reflections on History. Trans. M. D. Hottinger. London: G. Allen and Unwin. D’Andrade, R. (1987). Cultural meaning systems. In R. Shweder and R. LeVine, Eds., Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and Emotion, pp. 88–119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dumont, L. (1970). Homo Hierarchicus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Fiske, A. P. (1990). Relativity within Moose (”Mossi”) culture: four incommensurable models for social relationships. Ethos 18(2): 180–204. Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Hatch, E. (1983). Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology. New York: Columbia University Press. Herskovitz, M. J. (1972). Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism. New York: Random House. Holland, D., and N. Quinn, Eds. (1987). Cultural Models in Language and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hutchins, E. (1996). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays in Moral Development, vol. 1: The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper and Row. Kohlberg, L. (1983). Essays in Moral Development, vol. 2: The Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper and Row. Kuhn, T. (1977). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ladd, J. (1953). Ethical Relativism. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lucy, J. (1992). Language Diversity and Thought: A Reformulation of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nuckolls, C. (1997). Culture and the Dialectics of Desire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Piaget, J. (1932). The Development of Moral Reasoning in Children. New York: Free Press. Shore, B. (1996). Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture and the Problem of Meaning. New York: Oxford University Press. Shweder, R. (1989). Cultural psychology: what is it? In J. Stigler, R. Shweder, and G. Herdt, Eds., Cultural Psychology: The Chicago Symposia on Culture and Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–46. Vivas, E. (1950). The Moral Life and the Ethical Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Werner, H. (1948/1964). Comparative Psychology of Mental Development. Rev. ed. New York: International University Press. Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wilson, B., Ed. (1970). Rationality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wilson, R., Ed. (1997). Human Rights, Cultural Context: Anthropological Perspectives. London and Chicago: Pluto Press. Further Readings Benedict, R. (1934). Patterns of Culture. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Fernandez, J. (1990). Tolerance in a repugnant world and other dilemmas of cultural relativism in the work of Melville J. Herskovitz. Ethos 18(2): 140–164. Geertz, C. (1984). Distinguished lecture: anti-anti relativism. American Anthropologist 86(2): 263–278. Hartung, F. E. (1954). Cultural relativity and moral judgments. Philosophy of Science 21: 118–126. Horton, R. (1967). African traditional thought and Western science. Africa 37: 50–71, 155–187. Lucy, J. (1985). Whorf’s view of the linguistic mediation of thought. In E. Mertz and R. Parmentier, Eds., Semiotic Mediation: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives. Orlando, FL: Academic Press, pp. 73–98. Norris, C. (1996). Reclaiming Truth: Contribution to a Critique of Cultural Relativism. Durham: Duke University Press. Overing, J., Ed. (1985). Reason and Morality. London: Tavistock. Schoeck, H., and J. M. Wiggens. (1961). Relativism and the Study of Man. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. Shweder, R. (1990). Ethical relativism: is there a defensible version? Ethos 18(2): 205–218. Shweder, R., M. Mahapatra, and J. G. Miller. (1987). Culture and moral development. In J. Kagan and S. Lamb, Eds., The Emergence of Morality in Young Children. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 1–90. Spiro, M. (1986). Cultural relativism and the future of anthropology. Cultural Anthropology 1(3): 259
Moral Psychology Moral psychology is a branch of ethics. It concerns the features of human psychology whose study is necessary to the examination of the main questions of ethics, questions about what is inherently valuable, what constitutes human wellbeing, and what justice and decency toward others demand. Adequate examination of these questions requires an understanding of the primary motives of human behavior, the sources of pleasure and pain in human life, the capacity humans have for voluntary action, and the nature of such psychological states and processes as desire, emotion, conscience, deliberation, choice, character or personality, and volition. The study of these phenomena in relation to the main questions of ethics defines the field of moral psychology. At the heart of this study are questions about the intellectual and emotional capacities in virtue of which human beings qualify as moral agents. Humans, in being capable of moral agency, differ from all other animals. This difference explains why human action, unlike the actions of other animals, is subject to moral assessment and why humans, unlike other animals, are morally responsible for their actions. At the same time, not every human being is morally responsible for his or her actions. Some like the very young and the utterly demented are not. They lack the capacities that a person must have to be morally responsible, capacities that equip people for understanding the moral quality of their actions and for being motivated to act accordingly. Full possession of these capacities is what qualifies a person as a moral agent, and it is the business of moral psychology to specify what they are and to determine what full possession of them consists in. In modern ethics the study of these questions has largely concentrated on the role and importance of reason in moral thought and moral motivation. The overarching issue is whether reason alone, if fully developed and unimpaired, is sufficient for moral agency, and the field divides into affirmative and negative positions on this issue. Rationalist philosophers, among whom KANT is foremost in the modern period, defend the former. On their view, reason works not only to instruct one about the moral quality of one’s actions but also to produce motivation to act morally. Human beings, on this view, are moved by two fundamental kinds of desire, rational and nonrational. Rational desires have their source in the operations of reason, nonrational in animal appetite and passion. Accordingly, moral motivation, on this position, is a species of rational desire, and reason not only produces such desire but is also capable of investing it with enough strength to suppress the conflicting impulses of appetite and passion. Moral agency in human beings thus consists in the governance of appetite and passion by reason, and the possession of reason is therefore alone ordinarily sufficient to make one responsible for one’s actions. The chief opposition to this view comes from philosophers such as HUME and Mill. They deny that reason is ever the source of moral motivation and restrict its role in moral agency to instructing one about the moral quality of one’s actions. On this view, all desires originate in animal appetite and passion, and reason works in the service of these desires to produce intelligent action, action that is well aimed for attaining the objects of the desires it serves. Consequently, the primary forms of moral motivation, on this position, the desire to act rightly, the aversion to acting wrongly, are not products of reason but are instead acquired through some mechanical process of socialization by which their objects become associated with the objects of natural desires and aversions. Moral agency in human beings thus consists in cooperation among several forces, including reason, but also including a desire to act rightly and an aversion to acting wrongly that originate in natural desires and aversions. Hence, because the acquisition of these desires and aversions is not guaranteed by the maturation of reason, the possession of reason is never alone sufficient to make one responsible for one’s actions. This anti-rationalist view is typically inspired by, when not grounded in, the methods and theories of natural science as applied to human psychology. In this regard, the most influential elaboration of the view in twentieth century thought is Freud’s. Applying the general principles of personality development central to his mature theory, FREUD gave an account of the child's development of a conscience and a sense of guilt that explained the independence and seeming authority of these phenomena consistently with their originating in emotions and drives that humans like other animals possess innately. His account in this way speaks directly to the challenge that the rationalist view represents, for rationalists, such as Kant, make the independence and seeming authority of conscience the basis for attributing the phenomena of conscience, including their motivational force, to the operations of reason. A second dispute between rationalists and their opponents concerns the nature of moral thought. Rationalists hold that moral thought at its foundations is intelligible independently of all sensory and affective experiences. It is, in this respect, like arithmetic thought at its foundations. Kant’s view again sets the standard. In brief, it is that the concepts and principles constitutive of moral thought are 562 Morphology formal and universal, that their application defines an attitude of impartiality toward oneself and others, and that through their realization in action, that is, by following the judgments one makes in applying them, one achieves a certain kind of freedom, which Kant called autonomy. This view, unlike Kant’s view about moral motivation, which has little currency outside of philosophy, deeply informs various programs in contemporary developmental psychology, notably those of PIAGET and his followers, whose work on moral judgment and its development draws heavily on the formalist and universalist elements in Kant’s ethics. Opponents of this view maintain that some moral thought is embodied by or founded on certain affective experiences. In this respect they follow common opinion. Sympathy, compassion, love, humanity, and attitudes of caring and friendship are commonly regarded as moral responses, and in the views of leading anti-rationalist thinkers one or another of these responses is treated as fundamental to ethics. Accordingly, the cognitions that each embodies or the beliefs about human needs and well-being (or the needs and well-being of other animals) that each presupposes and to which each gives force count on these views as forms of foundational moral thought. Such thought, in contrast to the rationalist conception, is not resolvable into formal concepts and principles, does not necessarily reflect an attitude of impartiality toward oneself and others, and brings through its realization, not autonomy, but connection with others. In contemporary developmental psychology, this view finds support in work on gender differences in moral thinking and on the origins of such thinking in the child’s capacity for empathy. —John Deigh References Eisenberg, N., and J. Strayer, Eds. (1987). Empathy and Its Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Freud, S. (1923). The Ego and the Id. New York: Norton. Freud, S. (1931). Civilization and Its Discontents. New York: Norton. Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hume, D. (1751). Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Indianapolis: Hackett. Kant, I. (1788). Critique of Practical Reason. Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill. Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on Moral Development, vol. 1. San Francisco: Harper and Row. Mill, J. S. (1861). Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett. Nagel, T. (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child. New York: Free Press. Further Readings Blum, L. A. (1995). Moral Perception and Particularity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deigh, J. (1992). Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Deigh, J. (1996). The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dillon, R. S., Ed. (1995). Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect. New York: Routledge. Flanagan, O. (1991). Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Flanagan, O., and A. Rorty, Eds. (1990). Identity Character and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hoffman, M. L. (1982). Development of prosocial motivation: Empathy and guilt. In N. Eisenberg, Ed., The Development of Prosocial Behavior. New York: Academic Press, pp. 281– 313. Johnson, M. (1993). Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. May, L., M. Friedman, and A. Clark, Eds. (1996). Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Morris, H. (1976). On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Theory and Moral Psychology. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rorty, A. (1988). Mind in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Boston: Beacon Press. Rousseau, J.-J. (1763). Émile. New York: Basic Books. Schoeman, F., Ed. (1988). Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stocker, M. (1990). Plural and Conflicting Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stocker, M. (1996). Valuing Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1–25. Taylor, G. (1985). Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self- Assessment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thomas, L. (1989). Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Williams, B. (1981). Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. (1993). Shame and Necessity. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Wollheim, R. (1984). The Thread of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wollheim, R. (1993). The Mind and its Depths. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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poesie + pensieri di un anarchico (scusate la presunzione) by lametta Sunday, Mar. 05, 2006 at 8:13 PM mail: <mailto:> VE AMO
studiate o gente mia ma no solo alla scola soprattutto nella vita perche de coionate er monno e pieno e a noi tutti c'aritorna sto veleno percio fate come er krisna murti che a nessuno venne la sua pace perche e sua e sola ed e infinita (per chi non lo sapesse krisnamurti era un pacifista che ha vissuto fra le grandi guerre e merita di capirne il pensiero semplice ma efficace.)
NUN SO NIENTE
legge ste poesie se cosi possiamo di certo po quasi offenne se'n sei de roma certo n'ce poi capi proprio niente e poi n'te dico sta punteggiatura cosi evidente che quasi sembra confonnese co sta gente gente de roma sii bona e irriverente che pero e pure de na parola sola il resto nun so niente e daie sogna famme ride che li sogni tua so na smartita d'amor e confusione come se ce fosse ancora na crocifissione
Ultimamente leggo molti scritti che confermano un pensiero diffuso che rispecchia una forte contraddizione sociale. Quando si parla di essere selvaggi si dimentica con troppa facilita: 1) lo studio delle culture indigene 2) di esplicitare che molte teorie che riempiono la bocca di filosofi sono basate sulle frustrazioni e non su un approfondimento reale e multidisciplinare delle realtà descritte. 3) Attenzione alla demagogia soggiogata ad interessi
L’essere umano e un animale sociale che tende verso la legge del minimo sforzo come migliore adattatività al contesto nel quale e contenuto e cio lo ottiene, appunto, attraverso processi costruttivi nuovi ma che ricalcano la natura (noi non inventiamo nulla di nuovo ma rielaboriamo l’esistente ed in primo luogo la natura, ed è questo il motivo per il quale la biodiversita ecologica è la prima ricchezza). In questo vi è la giustificazione del lavoro di gruppo che troverete, anche, in qualsiasi realtà indigena. L’essere umano non è un virus ma una forma adattativi del sistema naturale che a causa della natura violenta di stampo egemonico o di potere cerca di sottomettere per dimostrare la propria superiorità evitando di porsi domande che fanno paura. Queste domande che fanno paura sorgono da cause diverse e ci hanno portato ad uno pseudosviluppo autodistruttivo che poi applichiamo, in modo meccanico ed insensato, anche nei rapporti con gli altri. Ovviamente in questo si puo trovare una affinita con il concetto di virus come semplificazione simbolica ma è proprio tale semplificazione o meglio il simbolismo stesso il peggior nemico della presa soggettiva di coscienza che costa fatica e volontà ma nello stesso tempo e il primo passo per raggiungere tale coscienza se si fga un lavoro di approfondimento. In questo modo d’immagine cosa ci si deve aspettare se non questo dalla maggior parte delle persone. Per concludere un virus è un agente che determina profonde trasformazioni alla vita ed è la prima forma di vita che ha fatto sviluppare tutte le altre forme quindi è in realtà un agente positivo al rinnovamento dell’esistente in forme sempre più evolute. Vorrei finire dicendo che in questo periodo elettorale gia intravedo pratiche di demistificazione e di diffamazione. Aggiungerei che la logica del distruggere per ricostruire è il primo nemico di un reale cambiamento in orizzontale e trasversale proprio perché nasce dalle stesse logiche che ci hanno condotto a questo processo autodistruttivo di cui vi dicevo sopra. La domando che mi sorge è a chi giova? La risposta che io trovo a tutti coloro che hanno creato questa merda che molti come me cercano di destrutturate perché cosi possono evitare di farsi carico delle proprie responsabilità.
In ultimo bisogna stare attenti alle facili strumentalizzazioni che si cercano di fare del pensiero anarchico perché in questa fase oltre all’università fanno paura anche loro, quindi ci sono molti soggetti che cercano di catturarne lo spirito per poi riutilizzarlo per fini a loro più convenevoli e che non necessariamente sono predefiniti ma potrebbero variare in funzione delle condizioni.
Vi aggiungo:
Sull'individualismo Anarchico
by L'individualista Anarchico Sunday, Mar. 05, 2006 at 5:30 la morale e una merda proprio perche si inquadra in una struttura sovradeterminata che tu giustamente chiami stato. A me personalmenmte piace l'etica. Se oltre a testi filosofici approfondissi su quelli antropologici potresti conprendere che l'essere umano come animale sociale tende alla ricerca di altri individui che possano in qualche modo condividere scelte e motivazioni. Quando fai una scelta e la condividi ti basi su di un presupposto di fiducia e rispetto della diversita che pero, eticamente cercherai di non calpestare. In questa societa dove la disgregazione e al suo apice queste forme minime di etica sociale sono lasciate al tempo che trovano proprio perchè le influenze della morale sono talmente ed abilmente costruite che ne diveniamo schiavi senza rendercene conto. Potrei dirti che se la tua etica è della non etica ti posso accettare ma il tuo sarebbe un rapporto eticamente corretto nei miei confronti. Il problema e che gli individui come complessita manipolabile sono troppo spesso utilizzati a loro insaputa per motivi di cui loro stessi sono ignari. Mi sento anarchico, sono individualista, non sopporto la morale ma cerco una chiave etica umana di rispetto e sopravvivenza con l'altro e se l'altro mi tradisce, quando la nostra relazione è esplicitata, m'incazzo. Nascondersi dietyro ad un dito per evitare di prendersi le proprie responsabilita non è un atteggiamento che definisco anarchico ma di vile e paraculo. Personalmente la mia ricerca è interdisciplinare e non si basa solo su testi di filosofia proprio perchè sono cosciente delle diversita e del valore individuale o se vuoi dell'Osservatore hamiltoniano. Certe volte molti bei discorsi forbiti e motivati da bei nomi famosi si riducono ad un nozionissmo settoriale e comodo che difende se stesso come un gruppo da coloro che non la pensano nello stesso modo (sociologia). Ti faccio un esempio: sto con una ragazza con il quale determino un etica esplicita e poi colei a cui difendo l'esistenza distrugge la mia con comportamenti vili e di rivincita. Mi incazzo e cerco di capire se gli sono stati indotti da una morale o da pressioni di diverso tipo psicologiche e subliminali od ancora se mi vuole fottere perchè sta li per questo coscientemente e poi reaggisco e ti assicuro non sono tenero tanto quanto la controparte. L'anarchia è una presa di coscienza continua e difficile che non dovrebbe lasciare spazio alla semplificazione di comodo perche cosi si fa la morale che puo essere chiamata anche "anarchia" nel senso che oggigiorno il potere prende tutte le parole e le trasforma in mode e utili. In conclusione chi dice che gli anarchico/a rifiuta la morale puo essere vero e lo è sicuramente in contesto come quello attuale ma che un anarchico/a non abbia etica e rispetto di coloro con cui vive il proprio esistere e una morale costruita e l'unica via per un anarchico/a e quella dell'etica e della capacita di confronto dove le idee trovano i loro spazi inevitabilmente.
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