SHELL's OIL CRIMES - BUTCHER OF THE EARTH

PART 1. POISONS STILL WITH US

Chemicals old & new: the "Drins," DBCP, leaded gasoline, and MTBE.

In 1975, at a time when dieldrin and aldrin were being banned in the US, Shell Chemical was building a plant in Brazil to produce them. For a decade or more, beginning in 1977, Shell produced aldrin, dieldrin, endrin and other pesticides at this plant, located near Paulinia, Brazil, about 75 miles (126 kms) northwest of Sao Paulo. During that time, there were spills and mishandlings of the chemicals at the plant, at least three incidents of which were cited by government officials.

In 1985, the sale of the drins was prohibited for most uses in Brazil, but apparently their production for export continued at the Shell plant until 1990. Three years later, Shell began the process of selling its Paulinia chemical plant to American Cyanamid and BASF. As part of the sales agreement that followed, Shell acknowledged there was contamination of the factory grounds, for which it took legal responsibility.

Offsite contamination, however, was another matter. Studies of the area later revealed that contamination had moved into the surrounding area, and could reach the nearby Atibaia River, one of the most important tributaries of the Piracicaba River, which provides water to half a million people.

Levels of dieldrin contamination at some offsite locations were recorded at 12 times the maximum limits set by Brazilian federal law. However, no decontamination work had begun in the area.

In February 2001, Shell admitted it had contaminated the groundwater and sections of the nearby community, and was ordered by the Sao Paulo State Environmental Protection Agency (CETESB) to begin a clean up.

Shell began providing clean drinking water to local residents and also began buying up vegetables produced at local farms that previously were sold in Sao Paulo for many years. The Paulinia City Hall, meanwhile, produced a report by August 2001 showing that 156 of the 181 residents examined had some degree of contamination from metals or pesticides which could result in various cancers, liver disorders, or neurological problems. That prompted the Public Ministry of the state of Sao Paulo in November 2001 to accuse Shell of negligence in exposing the people of Paulinia to pesticide residues, as well as possibly others at Vila Carioca where Shell also produced pesticides between 1950 and 1978.

Shell dismissed the Paulinia report, saying it used very low thresholds to measure contamination compared with those recommended by the World Health Organization.

Shell also claimed its own tests showed no human contamination. "If there is proof of contamination with the products that we handled there, we will assume the responsibility immediately, which is our policy worldwide," said Jose Cardoso, a Shell manager in Brazil. "But so far, there is no data indicating that."

Local residents, however, were calling for compensation and relocation. Sao Paulo officials, meanwhile, began looking at Shell’s operations a bit more closely. In May 2002, they ordered the shut down of Shell’s 11million liter fuel storage and distribution terminal, located in Vila Carioca. Sao Paulo charged that Shell lacked the proper license to operate the terminal, and had in fact been using a license that expired in 1985. Shell attributed that to a "misinterpretation of terms" by its local unit, and had a court order overturn the shutdown within hours.

Shell also charged the shutdown was an over reaction to the pesticide situation. A month later, Brazil’s environmental agency, CETESB, found unacceptably high levels of dieldrin in wells near the Vila Carioca, and fined Shell $38,963 (105,200 reals) for its Grave Fault of pollution at the site. As this book goes to press, there are continuing deliberations over the Shell contamination at both Paulinia and Vila Carioca, as well as potential claims and lawsuits being drafted by local residents in those areas.

The drin legacy in Brazil, however, is only part of Shell’s pesticide history.

PART 2. DANGEROUS PLACES

Shell refineries, terminals, and chemical plants are not always safe places

The Pandacan Petrochemical Depots: a 30 hectare oil and petrochemical tank farm and loading complex run by a group of oil companies including Shell, is located in a highly populated section of Manila. On any given day, the depot contains about 330 million liters of volatile substances in storage: gasoline, aviation fuel, crude oil, bunker oil, diesel, LPG, and other substances. Yet, within a two kilometer radius of the complex, there are more than 83,000 residents, as well as the Philippine Presidential Palace. Schools, churches, daycare centers, restaurants, and other small businesses also fall within this two kilometer radius. The Carlos P. Garcia High School, for example, is directly across the street from the Shell portion of the complex. Shell trucks hauling flammable materials move regularly to and from the facility near this school. Caltex, Petron, and other companies at the complex also have facilities near schools and homes. Over the years, there have been leaks and pollution from the complex, and occasionally fires. Maria Wilma Barrias, a neighbor of the Pandacan complex, recalls a fire at the Shell facility: ". . . You know, when there was a fire here, the employees of Shell were locked up inside. They didn’t let them out. The first place they fought the fire was inside instead of outside. They locked the doors. I know because my husband was working there. Putting out the fire at the depot was given priority before extinguishing it at the residences." Shell reports that there have been fires at their depot. A February 1987 fire occurred there after a loading hose disconnected from a truck at the LPG bulk filling station, resulting in property damage and lost work days. In October1997, there was a flash fire in one of Shell’s loading bays at the main fuel terminal, caused by a faulty grounding system.

Pilipinas Shell says no reports of incidents can be found earlier than 1996. "There are informal stories about one of the LPG sphere vents being struck by lightning in 1991 or 1992, and the escaping gas catching fire," says Shell. "The community was reportedly alarmed, but the fire was extinguished without any loss to property or lives, and no recorded or remembered community action." Still, many of the residents of Pandacan want the oil companies to honor a 1993 agreement they made with the Philippine government to move the depot to a new location by 2003. However, as the deadline for relocating the facility has approached, the companies have been stalling for time, calling for further study, or even reconsidering the move entirely. Shell, for example, says it may have to do a risk study on the move and questions whether, we really need to transfer or just improve our facilities. Jocelyn Dawis, Asuncion, a Manilla City Councilor, points out that relocation studies were done in 1993, and further study now that would take another 6 to 18 months is simply a delaying tactic. Safety is our Concern, says Shell in big letters on a billboard along the perimeter of the Pandacan complex - Because We Care. Yet many of the residents living in this part of Manilla have expressed their doubts about that claim.

On land, the Royal Dutch Shell group of companies operates refineries, chemical plants, storage terminals, gas processing plants, supply and product pipelines at hundreds of locations worldwide. Add to these hundreds of offshore oil and gas platforms and miles of underwater pipelines. At the retail and neighborhood level are the company’s 45,000 gas stations, distribution terminals, and countless delivery vehicles that travel through highly populated towns and cities on a daily basis. All of these facilities and transport systems deal with dangerous, volatile, and often hazardous materials. The cases presented here, while certainly not a complete measure of Shell’s entire global system, nonetheless indicate that Shell’s facilities are not as safe and well managed as they could be. Workers, communities, and the environment are too frequently at risk. The board of directors and management at Royal Dutch Shell, and its affiliate companies and contractors, have not done enough to incorporate fail safe measures, ongoing preventative maintenance, and the absolute latest technology to assure safe operations at all of their production, refining, and storage facilities worldwide. Given the level of scrutiny now being undertaken of corporate managements worldwide, and the growing frequency of shareholder and class action lawsuits to hold management and corporate leaders accountable for either avoidable liabilities and/ or preventable social transgressions, money spent on targeted investment to insure clean and safe operations is certainly well advised. Clearly, "ounces of preventable actions" taken now will trump, Billions In Court Ordered Payoffs as cure, not to mention bad PR. And simply as a matter of good business practice, and lowering the firm’s liability exposure and its insurance rates, Shell should want to be in the vanguard of technological improvement that puts safety on a par with production.

PART 3. CHRONIC POLLUTION TOXIC DRILLING FLUIDS

From well head to the corner gas station, the Shell system is releasing toxic chemicals.

Royal Dutch Shell, like every other oil company, uses tons and tons of additive and auxiliary substances to enable oil and gas drilling, drilling muds and drilling fluids among them. Some of this material can be very toxic, especially when mixed with oil and gas, or with the "production waters" that come to the surface during drilling. Some of the chemicals used can also be changed chemically during drilling due to heat, pressure, and/or interaction with other compounds. For years, much drilling waste was simply discarded in the environment, left in pits or evaporation ponds at land based operations, and discharged to the sea at offshore operations. Little of this waste, known as exploration and production waste, or "E & P" waste, is regulated, even in the US. Globally, the annual oil industry discharge of E&P wastes is about three million tons. As a leading player in the E&P business, Shell’s share of this discharge is considerable. True, some changes have begun to occur with offshore drill cuttings, now brought to shore for proper disposal. Still, with drilling fluids, there is a remaining and significant environmental problem. For the last 75 years or so, Shell has been using some fairly standard, and toxic substances to enable its drilling. Chief among these are barite and synthetic drilling oils. Barite, in reaction with other substances, and due to changes during drilling, becomes barium, a toxic substance. Barite, however, is no small business. Sold by Halliburton and other oil service companies, it is a $500 million annual global market. But barite isn’t the only substance that can do the job. In fact, there are some neglected existing alternatives available that are environmentally safer, more productive, and cheaper to use.

Tell Shell - He Did
I note that Shell operations created around 450,000 tones of hazardous waste in 2001, and most of this waste was drilling fluids and cuttings contaminated with oil and toxic heavy metals. When I was with Shell Research in The Netherlands I helped develop a novel ecological drilling fluid system based on formate brines. Shell rarely uses this exciting technology, but these benign and biodegradable formate brines have been widely used by other oil companies throughout the world over the past 8 years, and they have been particularly useful in reducing the amount of hazardous wastes created by drilling operations. Agip’s use of formate based drilling fluids in the environmentally sensitive Barents Sea is a fine example of how formates are being used to great effect by a responsible oil company to minimize the environmental impact of its drilling operations. Fortuitously, the use of formate brines as drilling fluids also appears to result in spectacular increases in oil and gas production, so there is a clear financial reward to be gained from using these ecological fluids. Given Shell’s commitment to "finding new ways to reduce the environmental impact of its operations", why are Shell operations not using their own formate brine technology to reduce the volume of their hazardous waste production?

Yours sincerely, John Downs 25 July 2002

2nd Letter, different Shell forum, same day

Every year the oil industry uses some 3 million tonnes of a toxic heavy metal (barium) in its well drilling fluids. Shell researchers showed as long ago as 1960 that common components of drilling fluids can solubilise the barium, creating a hazardous waste. Much of this hazardous drilling waste containing solubilised heavy metal ends up being discharged into our environment. Despite having developed an ecological drilling fluid technology to replace barium, and professing a desire to reduce the environmental impact of its operations, Shell is still a major user of barium in its drilling operations worldwide. I would like to open up a debate about whether Shell is ethically or morally justified in continuing to use large volumes of barium in its drilling fluids when it has a cost effective and ecological alternative technology, in the shape of its patented formate brine system, readily available but largely unused by the Shell drilling community.

Yours sincerely, John Downs (As of late August 2002, Mr. Downs had not received a reply from Shell to either letter).

Nearly 15 years ago, in fact, in 1987, two enterprising Shell scientists working at The Hague came up with better and safer drilling fluids. They discovered that sodium formate brine and potassium formate brine could serve as very effective drilling fluids. This was a significant discovery, and Shell patented their work product. But it wasn’t until 1993 that Shell first tested a sodium formate brine at its Draugen field in offshore Norway. Shell did little with its new invention from that point on, as most of the scientists who developed the new fluids left Shell. John Downs, one of those former Shell employees who developed and advocated the formate brines, became involved at a company named Cabot to develop the languishing fluids. Downs then licensed the technology from Shell, and began selling the formate brine technology to Shell’s competitors including BP, ExxonMobil, TotalFina, and others. Shell, however, was still not using its own invention. Instead, it continued to use what some have called "stone age" drilling fluid technologies known as the Di-Pro and Brine-Drill systems. All of this prompted Downs, frustrated with Shell’s history of nonuse of its own better and safer product, to avail himself to the Tell Shell web page to make his story public. In late July 2002, Down’s wrote two letters, in different forums, to the Tell Shell web page.

To date, Mr. Downs has yet to receive a reply from Shell. Part of the reason, he speculates, is that Shell has no one competent enough to reply, as all the scientists and technical staff that once worked on the formate brine project have left, with Shell now relying on contractor services to deal with things like drilling fluid. What Down’s has received, however, are queries from within the Shell empire from engineers and project managers wanting to know more about Shell’s own drilling fluids. Meanwhile, Shell’s competitors are reaping the benefits of safer and more productive drilling fluids. Agip, the Italianoil company, has successfully drilled exploration wells in the environmentally sensitive Barents Sea with the new fluids, which cost Agip half the price of the synthetics. Shell, however, continues to use its 75 year old drilling fluids, professing to the public that it is working hard for a Sustainable Future, but actually doing little in the present, at least in drilling fluids, to change its polluting practices.

In the Gulf of Mexico, for example, where Shell is a major player with hundreds of rigs, barium pollution is occurring daily. But only a few hundred miles away from most of these Shell rigs are the large scale formate brine production plants of Texas, which now classify their formate side streams as waste, shipped out for disposal. Royal Dutch Shell may be projecting a good image with its "sustainable development" rhetoric, magazine ads, and CEO speeches. Yet when it comes to the actual execution on these promises, and making obvious improvement on practices right under their noses like drilling fluids, there appears to be a big gap between talk and action. If Shell can let a proven, better technology like the formate brine drilling fluids languish for nearly 15 years, what else hasn’t it brought forward?

PART 4. SHELL AT SEA: MASSIVE OIL SPILL

The Brent Spar flap and Shell in the water.

On August 3rd, 1999, the Italian owned tanker, Laura D’Amato (96,000 dwt) spilled 300,000 liters of crude into Australia’s Sydney Harbor at Gore Bay. The spill occurred after the tanker docked at Shell Oil’s Gore Cove terminal at the Clyde Refinery in New South Wales. Sea valves inside the tanker were opened when it docked at Gore Bay. The winds off the harbor soon spread acrid fumes from the spill across residential areas, prompting thousands of telephone calls to emergency services. The spill soon became major news, featured in local newspapers and evening television news shows. The Big Spill, Stain on the Harbor, was the August 4th headline on the front page of the Sydney Morning Herald. Sydney Harbor, the pride of Australia, had been fouled. Fortunately, the winds kept the spill contained for the most part in Gore Bay. Still, light crude was found along a 10 kilometer stretch of harbor shoreline and hundreds of birds were poisoned.

A massive response attended the spill, with more that 300 people and numerous agencies involved. The clean up effort, which lasted for about three weeks, continued through the end of August. But shortly following the spill, on August 4 th, Shell Australia manager, Gary Smith, was quoted in the paper offering an apology to the local community. "We sincerely apologize to residents for the inconvenience they are experiencing from odors associated with the oil."

And that evening, on ABC TV local news, correspondent Kerry O’Brien did a short interview with Shell manager, Doug Hyde:

O’Brien: . . . But do you know the extent to which Shell satisfies itself that the crew of the tanker unloading at your terminals are competent to do so?

Hyde: . . . If that is a shortfall in any of our processes, Kerry, that will come out in our own internal investigation and in the other investigations that will go on.

O’Brien: . . . Which you will share with us in the end we hope?

Hyde: We will.

The debate over responsibility for the spill began almost from the first day of the spill. Jim Starkey, head of the Australian Institute of Petroleum, said the spill might have been prevented if the Ship/Shore Safety Check List had been followed properly 22, a procedure jointly shared by both terminal operator and ship captain. While the ship’s captain was later fined in the incident, and not Shell, some critics, among them, Friends of the Earth Australia, believed Shell’s harbor master was also responsible, citing a failure on Shell’s part to effectively implement the joint Ship/Shore Safety Checklist and ensure safe operating procedures. Friends of the Earth also charged that Shell’s responsibility and liability extended to the competency of the chartered ship’s crew and safe operations at their terminal. At least one official, Peter Morris, Chair of the International Commissions on Shipping, and involved with a 1992 Australian inquiry into shipping and terminal operations, had also stated that oil terminal owners "have a responsibility to ensure that the vessel they hire does meet all the required international safety standards, and is operated in a safe manner." The Laura D’Amato spill, however, wasn’t the first incident at the Gore Cove terminal. In mid July 1993, about ten tons of crude oil spilled into Sydney Harbor during a routine transfer between storage tanks at the terminal. A long slick on the harbor followed. After months of investigation, Shell was found guilty and fined $42,000, ordered to pay $7,682 in costs, and required to spend $160,000 on clean up. In 1984, about 40 tons of crude oil spilled into the harbor at Gore Cove after a Shell barge with a tank capacity of 1,217 tons had been overfilled with 1,900 tons of oil. In that case, Shell was found to be negligent and was fined $25,000.

Two years after the Laura D’Amato spill, in hearings on the incident before a New South Wales parliamentary committee, Shell’s Clyde refinery manager Gary Smith, although pointing to improvements in spill response and detection, said he could not guarantee that spills would not occur in the harbor again. "Shell was deeply concerned by the oil spill which occurred in Gore Bay," Smith told the hearing. "We have fully investigated the incident and whilst the investigation team did not find deficiencies in the action of Shell staff or Shell procedures, a number of recommendations were made. . .Unfortunately, I can’t give guarantees."

Spying for Shell James Bond he wasn’t, but Manfred Schlickenrieder had the perfect cover for spying on environmental groups – a television camera, hair over the collar, and seemingly good leftist credentials. "Manfred filmed and interviewed all the time," recalled Fouad Hamden, communications director of Greenpeace who later learned that Greenpeace had been had, as they say, by the paid infiltrator. "The bastard was good, I have to admit." In 1996, Schlickenrieder began spying on green groups and their associates for the British oil industry through the high powered London based firm of Hakluyt & Company, Ltd. Hakluyt was founded in 1995 by former British intelligence agents, with board, management, and affiliated Hakluyt Foundation members from both Shell and British Petroleum. Sir William Purves, former CEO of Shell Transport, served as Hakluyt chairman. Sir Peter Holmes, former Shell chairman, is the current president of the Hakluyt Foundation, which works as a kind of supervisory board. Hakluyt prides itself on its ability to get good current, on the ground intelligence for its industrial clients. Shell hired Hakluyt in April 1996 in the wake of Greenpeace’s Brent Spar protest and the subsequent threats and attacks on Shell’s European gas stations. When the story first broke in June of 2001 in London’s Sunday Times, Shell confirmed it had been Hakluyt’s client through December 1996. "We did talk to Hakluyt about what intelligence they could gather," explained Mike Hogan, director of media relations at Shell UK. Schlickenrieder’s assignments on behalf of Shell also included the company’s troubles in Nigeria. He even produced a documentary on Nigeria, entitled, Business As Usual: The Arrogance of Power, about the environmental and human rights campaign mounted against Shell. By 1997, however, the action and Schlickenrieder’s services, had shifted to BP and that company’s drilling in the North Atlantic. Sources: Maurice Chittenden and Nicholas Rufford, "UK: MI6 ‘Firm’ Spied on Green Groups," The Sunday Times (London), June 17, 2001, and, Eveline Lubber, Big Brother Incorporated, PR Watch, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002.

PART 5. NIGERIA: BRUTAL EXECUTIONS, and a POLLUTED COUNTRY

We depend on fishing and farming, and to take that away from us, it’s genocide. If you take away our land, and then you pollute the water and so on, it’s just saying we don’t have any right to live.
The Niger River Delta, on the southwestern coast of Nigeria in western Africa, is a vital and life sustaining natural resource. Sprawling over a 70,000 square kilometer region five degrees north of the Equator, it not only drains the Niger and Benue rivers, but also embraces the largest wetland in Africa and one of the continent’s largest stands of coastal mangrove forest. Its web of streams, freshwater swamps, and coastal barrier islands make it one of the richest biological areas in the world. Its fertile soils have supported the cultivation of rice, sugar cane, cassava, palm oil, yams and beans for decades.

Thanks in part to its rich mangrove breeding grounds, it has more freshwater fish species that any other coastal system in West Africa. But the Niger Delta is rich in something else too, Oil. For beneath the surface, within what are termed "relatively simple geological structures" are estimated proven oil reserves of 22.5 billion barrels. Although the majority of the oil deposits found in the Delta are considered small, each with 50 million barrels or less, at least 250 of them have been identified and opened, with another 200 yet to be measured.

And the Niger Delta’s crude is good crude, the kind oilmen love, with a low sulfur content and a light, flowable viscosity. But that’s not all. Nigeria also has natural gas. With proven reserves estimated at 124 trillion cubic feet, it is the world’s ninth largest source. But it is the oil that has created the most promise and the most peril. Royal Dutch Shell has been involved in Nigeria longer than any other major oil company. Its roots go back to the country’s time as a British colony, and to 1937 when the Colonial Mineral Ordinance gave Shell D’Arcy exclusive exploration and prospecting rights.

PART 6. NORCO, LOUISIANA: POISING YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD

One community’s history with Royal Dutch Shell.

My question is: Are you going to be true to what you say on paper about cleaner air and about being fair and being a good neighbor. . .?

Margie Richard, President, Concerned Citizens of Norco, The Hague, November 2000.

In Louisiana, about 25 miles up the Mississippi River from New Orleans, a man named Pierre Trepagnier was awarded a huge gift of land for his services in the Louisiana militia. It was some time around 1790. The land grant was made to Trepagnier by the Spanish governor of Louisiana, which wasn’t yet part of the United States. Two hundred years later, on this same land, a modern day battle would unfold between the Shell Oil Company and a small community named Diamond. That struggle, which continues to this day, pits the Shell Oil Company against the African American descendants of former Trepagnier Plantation slaves, some of whom, along with others, came to live in Diamond. At issue by the 1950s would be matters of land, public health, and community rights.

In 1973, gas shot from a pipeline servicing the Shell Chemical plant. One resident, Helen Washington, was killed instantly. Another, Leroy Jones, cutting the lawn at Mrs. Washington’s at the time, was set on fire. He died two days later at the hospital. Several years later, in February 1977, Shell bought the lot and home where Mrs. Washington was killed. The price was $3,000. Other incidents occurred too, like the 1985 and 1988 refinery explosions, terrifying not only the residents of Diamond, but all of Norco and nearby communities. But Shell’s two operations were also affecting the quality of life throughout the Norco region on a subtler scale, through continued, chronic releases of chemical pollutants to the air and water. The two Shell operations by the 1980s were producing substantial quantities of material. They were also producing substantial quantities of waste, water and air pollutants, and accidental chemical releases. Residential communities near the Shell facilities, whether Diamond or other Norco communities, as well as outlying communities close enough to get a whiff of Shell’s operations when the wind came their way, were being subjected to Shell pollutants, some directly by air on a daily basis, and others at a more inconspicuous level, through surface waters receiving the wastewater from the plants’ operations.

GOOD NEIGHBOR SHELL?

After the tragic May 1988 explosion at the Norco refinery that killed eight workers, injured 20 others, and caused the evacuation of 4,500 people (see Chapter 4), more of Norco’s residents became wary of their petrochemical neighbors. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the 1988 explosion, Shell faced a huge number of claims for property damage and personal injury. And while the company paid out sizeable sums, it also moved in ways that some found suspect. A 1993 court settlement gave thousands of dollars to a large group of some 17,000 claimants named in a class action lawsuit. However, others were excluded from those payments because of documents they had signed with Shell in 1988 agreeing to take instant payments of $1,000 each from the company in return for a promise not to sue. Shell had made such arrangements with about 1,100 people. Margie Richard, a resident of Norco’s Diamond community, was one of them. "It was a fast routine," recalled Richard in September 1993 of what Shell had done following the 1988 explosion. "Why would they do that at a time when they knew people were shaken up?" Deonne DuBarry, an attorney representing some of Norco’s plaintiffs in 1993 thought the Shell deals were unfair. "Basically, these people did not know what they were doing. I think Shell . . . took advantage of people in shock." Diamond, in fact, was a community at high risk, a community in the cross hairs should there be a major accident at either of the Shell plants.

Shell had periodically bought up the homes of residents living near its facilities in Norco since the 1970s, maintaining that this was part of an ongoing program to establish buffers on the boarders of its facilities. In fact, by the late 1990s, Shell had bought up nearly 125 homes in the Norco area. Many of Diamond’s residents, learning more about what they were living with, just wanted to get out, and felt Shell bore the responsibility for buying them out at reasonable prices. In the mid 1990s, about 250 members of the Diamond community brought a lawsuit against Shell seeking to be relocated. However, after two weeks of testimony the residents lost their case and decided not to appeal. By 1998, however, the push for Shell to buy out the community was renewed by changing circumstances. Further incidents at the chemical plant had touched off the "bucket brigade" air sampling.

EPA and DEQ by then had also started paying more attention to Shell. But one incident in particular served as a lightning rod, and both reenergized the community and drew attention again to the plant’s dangers. On December 8th , 1998, early in the morning, Shell workers began knocking on doors in Diamond warning them to stay in doors as a tank at the plant had over pressurized and might explode. By mid day, however, Shell officials said they had turned the problem around and regained control of the tank. But then, in another part of the complex, a cloud of emissions was released that came through the Diamond community causing burning eyes and some respiratory problems.

By 1998, however, the push for Shell to buy out the community was renewed by changing circumstances. Further incidents at the chemical plant had touched off the Bucket Brigade air sampling. EPA and DEQ by then had also started paying more attention to Shell. But one incident in particular served as a lightning rod, and both reenergized the community and drew attention again to the plant’s dangers. On December 8th , 1998, early in the morning, Shell workers began knocking on doors in Diamond warning them to stay in doors as a tank at the plant had over pressurized and might explode. By midday, however, Shell officials said they had turned the problem around and regained control of the tank. But then, in another part of the complex, a cloud of emissions was released that came through the Diamond community causing burning eyes and some respiratory problems.

In August 2001, Shell inflamed the debate in the Diamond community when it purchased a wooded section on the Diamond community boarder called the Gaspard Line that separated the black and white sections of Norco. Shell paid $158,000 for the parcel. The purchase not only raised fears of Shell further expansion, but also raised questions about Shell’s priorities. "You mean to tell me that grass and trees come before human beings?," asked Diamond resident Gaynell Johnson, who felt Shell should be focusing on the residential buy out.

Shell said it was not intending to develop the parcel, thought it was time to take down an old racial barrier, and said it might turn the parcel into a park. But Shell also reiterated it was not changing its plans to buy out more residents. Our intention has never been to buy out the town of Norco, said Lilly Galland, Shell’s public information officer.

Through early 2002, Concerned Citizens of Norco and the Louisiana Bucket Brigade kept the pressure on. In February, Dr. Peter Orris, a Harvard, and Yale educated occupational and environmental medical expert from the University of Illinois’ Chicago Hospital and Medical Center, came to Norco to speak about Shell’s emissions and public health. By May it was revealed that a Public Broadcasting System film had been made about the Norco/Diamond fight, titled Norco, A Company Town Divided, slated to air in July 2002. That same month, a contingent of Norco and Diamond activists traveled to protest at Shell’s Houston, Texas headquarters.

Behind the scenes at the negotiating table, meanwhile, there appeared to be some give in Shell’s position. A new deal might be in the offing. After subsequent negotiations in June 2002, Shell agreed to extend the buy out program to the entire four block Diamond community. Shell gave the residents two choices in the program: to stay in Diamond and receive a no interest home improvement loan of $25,000, forgivable if residents continue to own their house for five years, or, sell their home to Shell at an appraised value, with a minimum of $80,000 for houses and $50,000 for mobile homes. In addition, some residents could also be eligible for a $5,000 moving allowance, $500 professional service allowance for consultation with financial and other experts, and miscellaneous expense allowance of $15,000. The residents had to decide which option they would take by August 30, 2002. Residents selling their property would be required to relocate outside of the buy out area. In all, 170 properties and some 350 to 400 people in the Diamond community could be involved, at a cost to Shell estimated around $12 million.

"We have come to recognize that the Diamond community is truly unique," wrote Shell Chemical’s site manager Wayne Pearce in a letter sent to Diamond residents. "The community is like an extended family, and we realize now that our previous efforts to create a greenbelt around our facilities may have created difficulties for some families and caregivers in the Diamond neighborhood." In addition to Shell’s letter, a joint statement was issued by Shell and Concerned Citizens of Norco reflecting the learning that occurred on each side of the table. "Shell has participated in a series of frank and open discussions with CCN and Diamond residents and believes the Diamond Options Program . . . is a fair offer that provides choices to residents, said Shell’s Wayne Pearce. "CCN believes that the Diamond Options Program demonstrates Shell commitment to listen and respond to its neighbor’s concerns," said Delwyn Smith, CCN president. "We will continue discussions with Shell to ensure the successful implementation of the program. . . ."

Smith also underscored the difficulty of the negotiations for the Diamond community, but extended frank appreciation to Shell for staying the course. "I want to tell you that these sessions have not been easy to participate in because of the history and our experiences of living with the impact of the [Shell] facility and the impacts of Shell’s decision to relocate just one half of our tight knit community. . . ," he said. "I am grateful that Wayne Pearce. . . . committed both himself and his staff to participating in the dialogue sessions with us and hearing our urgent demands for change."

Shell’s turnaround met with praise from the activist community working on the Diamond fight. "The key was that Shell was ready to listen after decades of complaints," said Anne Rolfes, of the Louisiana Bucket Brigade. Rolfes even suggested the Norco process might become a model for other communities faced with similar problems. As the Norco example has shown , said Rolfes in mid July 2002, the people will not stop fighting for what is right. The blueprint is here. Shell has set the example.

PART 7. CANADA: SOUR GAS, SICK CATTLE, and UNHAPPY NEIGHBORS

"They have industrialized a landscape as beautiful and ecologically precious as Montana’s Rocky Mountain Front."

It was in December 1998 that Shell Canada first made the proposal. The company wanted to drill for natural gas in an area of central Alberta known as Rocky Mountain House. Alberta is one of the western Canadian provinces located along the US boarder, north of Idaho right between British Columbia and Saskatchewan. Alberta is a big province, bigger, in fact, than Texas and Montana combined. With the Canadian Rockies running through it, and a good share of northern temperate zone biological diversity to its claim, Alberta is a stunningly beautiful place, with much worth preserving that isn’t preserved. This is the province of Banff National Park and Lake Louise. It is also the province of hard working ranchers and farmers. But, most of all, Alberta is an energy province, rich in natural gas and other resources; a place that has had the attention of Shell Oil and other big companies for decades. But some of the natural gas in Alberta is a special kind of gas, called "sour gas," which means it contains a high proportion of hydrogen sulfide, or H 2 S, as the chemists call it. Sour gas, known for its strong rotten egg odor, can also be quite lethal, killing a person in an instant after inhalation. The folks in Rocky Mountain House weren’t very happy to learn that Shell might be arriving in their community to drill for sour gas at a site known as "Ferrier Well 7-7." In fact, as soon as the Shell public information package began arriving in the mail of Rocky Mountain House residents, the community began its fight. "There was a public meeting held within 36 days of receipt of this information," explains Eric Tait, a school teacher and chair of the Clearwater Coalition, the group of landowners that came together to oppose the well. "Approximately 50 people attended . . . and they were absolutely adamant that they would do everything they could to oppose the well."*

The people at Shell, however, saw it differently. "Shell has had over 50 years of safe drilling and operating of sour gas wells," explained Georg Gerlach, Shell’s project manager, "and we feel that there won’t be any issue at all with any kind of exposure." Shell already had secured permission from the subsurface owner to drill the well, and also had permission from the surface owner to begin drilling. However, it didn’t have final regulatory approval, and it also wanted to have community support. So Shell began a process of negotiation with local landowners and the community for their support. "We respect Shell for coming to the table and talking about these issues," said Colin and Felicity Manuel, landowners who had moved to Canada from Kenya in 1975, wanting the protection that Canadian laws presumably provided landowners that were not available in Kenya. "[W]hat is happening in the wider community [in Rocky Mountain House] is people like ourselves getting very angry with these smaller companies that come in and just go in and do these things, and there’s no discussion, and we’re left high and dry regardless of what happens."

Shell also had continuing pipeline problems, as the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board ruled in October 1999 that a highly corroded section of Shell’s Carbondale pipeline had to be replaced, two other lines decommissioned, and a part of the operation then located in Screwdriver Creek Valley had to be moved. The Carbondale line supplied gas to the Shell Waterton Gas Plant, but the EUB found a "significant risk of future failure" in the part of the line located in the bottom of Screwdriver Creek Valley. An EUB inquiry into this Shell operation had been held in March 1999, when farmers Dave and Jean Sheppard, who lived a few kilometers away, reported relentless flaring over the past three years, as well as a 1997 pipeline leak that killed several animals, the second such leak there within months of the lines opening. "It suggested the pipeline was maybe not safe, in spite of their assurances they had everything under control," said Dave Sheppard. Although the EUB ruled in the Sheppards’ favor, Dave Sheppard reported difficulty in finding experts that would testify on his behalf in the fight. "Most of them work for the big companies," he said, "and don’t want to be critical of them."

So it was not surprising, given this history, that Shell had a fight on its hands during 1999 and 2000 as it sought to drill a new well at Rocky Mountain House.

Back at Rocky Mountain House
But Shell thought it was making progress in its talks with the local residents in that community, seeking to talk through the concerns and get to a negotiated agreement. But the talks broke down. Still, Shell insisted it could do the job right and without incident. "We have engaged in almost two years of community consultation and six months of mediation in an effort to understand the community’s concerns," explained Ian Kilgour, a Shell Canada manager. "Our ongoing commitment is to continue to develop natural gas resources in an environmentally, socially and economically responsible manner consistent with our corporate policy on sustainable development." But now it was up to the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB). For two weeks beginning in early November 2000, the EUB held forth at the Dovercourt Community Hall, listening to all sides during an extensive public hearing. But in the end, the EUB rejected Shell’s application for the $12 million (C$) deep well, saying that public safety could not reasonably be assured by Shell’s emergency response plan. The ruling, coming in April 2001, stunned Shell and all of Alberta’s natural gas industry.

In its decision, the EUB paid special attention to the unique topographic and demographic conditions in the vicinity of the proposed well and the potential release rate of gas from the well "under reasonable worst case conditions." In its decision, the EUB explained: "Having carefully considered all of the evidence, the Board is of the view that the emergency response plan proposed by Shell Canada has not adequately addressed these unique conditions. Since public safety cannot be acceptably assured, the Board does not believe the drilling of the well, as currently proposed, to be in the public interest. Therefore, the Board denies Application No. 1042932 without prejudice to any future application."

The EUB found some unique geographic and demographic problems that could confront the community in the event of a gas release emergency. The Clearwater River, for example, created a significant barrier to effective evacuation. The area is also frequented by large numbers of recreational users, some pursuing activities in steep river valleys. In the winter, snowbound roads could be a special problem. Communicating with dispersed and rural populations could also be a problem in an emergency situation. In examining the potential impacts on land use and land values from the development, the EUB found a somewhat uneven playing field, noting that when it came to evaluating economic benefits of energy development, there were well established and simple tools available. But this same level of analysis was lacking, and not easily available for assessing the costs of such development to nearby landowners. (This was not necessarily a fault of Shell’s, but a kind of analysis that Shell, as a leader, could help advance and bring to a higher level of standing on behalf of communities.) But the EUB held particularly strong objection to some of Shell’s failings in dealing with the community:

It is clear that in designing its initial public consultation program, Shell significantly underestimated the concerns of the area residents. It is equally clear that Shell made a number of additional errors in the early stages of its consultation program. Shell acknowledged that these included assuming that the presence of regional oil and gas development meant that public concern about new development would be reduced. Other concerns included concluding negotiations for the well site prior to initiating community discussions, initially relying on a mail out of information packages as the primary communication tool, and providing a narrow time period, over a holiday season, for the public to read and respond to that information package. In the Board’s view, the result was a serious erosion in public trust in Shell from the outset. The Board accepts the interveners’ views that these initial errors very likely made future effective consultation almost impossible, despite Shell’s subsequent efforts.

For Shell, the Rocky Mountain House rejection was perhaps just a little skirmish, a rare loss in the broader global stream of dozens of Shell projects that are typically approved in any given year. Even in Canada, where Shell is one of the largest companies and biggest employers, the company has numerous and major ongoing projects. In northern Alberta, Shell holds a controlling 60 percent share of the Athabasca Oil Sands Project, which includes the Muskeg River Mine, 75 kilometers north of Fort McMurray, and the Scotford Upgrader, a processing facility adjacent to Shell’s Scotford refinery north of Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta. The Muskeg River Mine site and lease area contains more than five billion barrels of oil sands targeted for strip mining. Shell is expecting to extract about 1.65 billion barrels over 30 years. With large trucks and shovels, a mixture of sand and oil is mined, then mixed with warm water to separate out the oil, which is then sent to an upgrader for further refining. Shell says that oil sands have the potential to supply up to 50 percent of Canada’s crude oil needs by 2007. Currently, the oil sands share is about 18 percent. Oil sands conversion, however, is not the most energy efficient or environmentally, clean of hydrocarbon processes. By late 2002, however, Shell expects that an estimated 155,000 barrels of bitumen will be produced every day at the Muskeg River mine. Shell also holds offshore and onshore interests in the Sable gas fields off Nova Scotia, produces heavy oil through thermal recovery at the Peace River project, and is part of a consortium involved with the Norwest Territory Aboriginal Pipeline Group in Arctic Canada, with plans to build a $1.9 billion pipeline to transport natural gas from the MacKenzie River Delta to markets in lower Canada and the US. Shell also operates refineries and chemical plants in Montreal, Sarnia, and Scotford.

You’d Fight Too! . . .
Imagine you live in a country where the government owns almost everything under your feet: the rocks, the gas, the oil, you name it. This state in turn makes billions by selling these mineral rights to a 1,000 different companies. Over time, these companies industrialize the landscape with a million kilometers of seismic lines, 300,000 kilometers of pipelines, hundreds of gas plants and tens of thousands of wells, and all in a pretty ad hoc fashion. Even parks must sport wells and pipelines. . . . Now imagine you are a landowner in this Soviet style state. A company comes along and proposes to put a sour gas well in front of your dining room. Someone might explain that the good people of California need to stay cool in the summer and the good people of Ontario need to stay warm in the winter. You’re offered $25,000 for the inconvenience and annual rent of $5,000 as "hush money."

Generally speaking, no one will tell you that sour gas is a cyanide like poison. Or that it’s so toxic that the Canadian government even used it in its secret chemical warfare program during the Second World War. Or that one gas well might to lead to another four; or a pipeline. Or ceaseless traffic, access roads and a fax machine in your kitchen so the gas company can contact you night and day in case there is an emergency. Now imagine you have an objection to this intrusion. You are given a public hearing before a state board that receives most of its funding from the oil and gas industry. The board has a funny technocratic name: the Energy and Utility Board. It claims to operate in the public interest, which means its job is to generate more revenue for the state. It will often patiently listen to objections and then declare that "there is a need" for the well. The landowner is damned. Imagine four decades of damning decisions. Now something goes wrong with the nice well in your backyard and the pipeline fragmenting your crop land and the shiny sour gas plant upwind of your property. There is a leak; an upset; a 30 foot high burning flame that sounds like a jet airplane and rattles your house. Your family and your livestock then breathe hydrocarbons that the medical literature has identified as brain melters, lung wasters and sex changers. Your cattle die and your children pass out cold. Someone develops facial paralysis, multiple sclerosis, or other neurological symptoms. Well, that’s just too bad because industry does most of the monitoring and the self policing in Alberta. You might wait months for redress, even years.

According to the state, these emissions are harmless; it’s just an odor problem; it’s in the public interest for rural Albertans to smell these odors. (For years the EUB had only one mobile air monitor.) . . . Not much has changed in Alberta since [Wiebo Ludwig’s sabotage incidents] made international headlines. Tensions remain so high in the countryside that many pipelines and wells now have 24 hour guards. Industry even reports people to the RCMP for merely taking pictures of flaring wells. In fact, Alberta has the highest rate of Eco Terrorism of any jurisdiction on the continent and some of the nation’s highest rates of respiratory and neurological diseases. Every week a family is exposed to toxic poisons or displaced by energy development. . . . And each week, industry and government mostly refuse to compensate those people harmed, or even recognize the legitimacy of their claims. As a result, groups of landowners routinely contest sour gas developments and have launched more than 30 toxic torts against industry. . . . Rural Albertans deserve a separate agency that upholds their rights and that has the power to duly compensate them for damages. The state needs to impose density controls on sour gas development in areas of high population. That means the government must learn to say no to industry. Tough regulations on air pollution and flaring need to be introduced and enforced. Oil executives should be fined for bad practices that affect the property rights of down winders. Last but not least the EUB needs a dozen environmental forensic teams to investigate air pollution and water contamination in a timely fashion . . .

Excerpted from Andrew Nikiforuk, "Maybe You’d Fight Too," Globe & Mail, November 14, 2001, p. 25. Nikiforuk is author of Saboteurs: Wiebo Ludwig’s War Against Big Oil, which tells the story of Dutch born cleric and Alberta landowner Wiebo Ludwig who rose up against Alberta’s oil and gas industry committing acts of oilfield violence and sabotage, served 18 months in Canadian prison for his actions.

PART 8. SENSITIVE PLACES - SHELL’S FOOTPRINT IN DELICATE HABITAT

PIGEON RIVER COUNTRY, MICHIGAN
In the summer of 1968, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (DNR) decided to open for oil and gas development a 550,000 acre region of forests and streams in northern Michigan known as Pigeon River Country. Covering parts of Ostego, Montmorency and Cheboygan counties in the upper part of the lower peninsula, the area encompassed a huge region of wildness with few roads and clear streams, covered by maturing, second growth forest. Ernest Hemingway had hunted and fished in the area and wrote about it. Aldo Leopold, the famed ecologist and writer, called it "The Big Wild." The oil and gas industry, however, called it opportunity. For beneath the region being leased, which also included 57,000 acres of the Pigeon River State Forest, lay the Niagaran-Salina formation, a vast deposit of oil and gas running for about 150 miles in a 20 mile wide swath between Manistee and Rogers City. State officials at the time had no idea of how rich the play was, which in the 1970s would touch off the most drilling activity in the US outside of Alaska’s North Slope. By the time the leasing sale ended, the state had something over $1 million in revenue, while Shell Oil, Amoco, and Nomeco snapped up most of the acreage in Pigeon River Country.*

In February 1979, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the environmentalists, blocking Shell from drilling its ten wells. But that wasn’t the end of it by any means. Shell decided to play hard ball. It drafted a bill with 28 of Michigan’s 38 Senators as cosponsors that threatened to gut the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, using the backdrop of the national energy crisis as the political wedge. Governor Milliken suggested he would veto any such bill if it did not, at a minimum, contain protections for the contested Pigeon River region.

SHELL AND THE EVERGLADES
Elsewhere in the US, Shell has not always worried about entering sensitive habitat. In the early 1990s in southern Florida, Shell sought permission to explore and drill in the Everglades Water Conservation Areas in western Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade counties. Shell, Exxon, and Sunniland Pipeline Company were among companies at the time that had sought or obtained leases in or near the area. Shell, in fact, leased 70,000 acres of land from the Miccosukee Indians, whose Broward County reservation sits on the northern edge of the Everglades National Park. In January 1991, Shell requested a permit from the US Interior Department’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to drill an exploratory well. The Miccosukee’s land, where Shell wanted to drill, was just outside Water Conservation District 3, a recharge area for the Biscayne Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to South Florida. The Water Conservation Area is also a vital source of recharge water for the Everglades National Park.

SHELL IN THE FOREST
From its earliest days in Borneo in the late 19 th century, through more current times in South America, African, and elsewhere, Shell’s oil and gas projects have run into conflict with forests tropical and otherwise. But apart from its direct oil and gas drilling conflicts within forests, Shell has also been involved in the forest as a business. Throughout its history, dating from the 1920s, Shell has been involved periodically in various kinds of forest ventures in at least 11 countries. It has planted eucalyptus plantations in Chile, the Congo, Uruguay, and Paraguay. It has also planted pine plantations in New Zealand, and has run or attempted to develop other forest operations in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Thailand, and Tanzania. In 1989, Shell invested $420 million in a venture with Scott Paper and Citibank to cultivate six million trees in Chile. The trees were to be used in part to fuel Shell’s $285 million short fiber pulp plant.

Places Not To Go Shell today sees itself very much on the leading edge of companies that are now mindful of the importance of protecting wildlife, sensitive places, and biodiversity.

But rather than designate a list of significant or important places, or fragile ecological zones where it will not go, Shell appears to take an ad hoc, site by site, Never Say Never approach, deciding, as the times may warrant, whether it will drill or build in a particular location, sensitive or not. Shell typically states that it can produce in such sensitive areas without creating harm to the environment or wildlife, or that it will attenuate the harm as it goes or clean up later. Yet history shows all too frequently that harm is more typically the result.

REFERENCES
http://shellfacts.com
http://gcmonitor.org/article.php?id=242
http://gcmonitor.org/article.php?id=274
http://tara-foundation.org
http://www.savetara.com
http://www.taraskryne.org
book: Riding the Dragon, Royal Dutch Shell and the Fossil Fire, author: Jack Doyle

Per the Sustainable Industries Journal,
the Pentagon has blocked the construction of 16 Wind Energy sites in the USA.
The military claims the Wind Farms are a threat to national security.
Maybe the Wind Farms are a threat to Big Oil and Big Coal?

OIL PRICES SURGE. BUSH - NOT MY FAULT
http://arkansas.indymedia.org/newswire/display/20177/index.php
http://www.binghamtonpmc.org/newswire/display/46/index.php
http://maineindymedia.org/newswire/display/4406/index.php

GLOBAL WARMING DESTROYS WINE INDUSTRY
http://hamilton.indymedia.org/newswire/display/753/index.php
http://www.campaigncc.org

WHO KILLED THE ELECTRIC CAR?
http://www.sonyclassics.com/whokilledtheelectriccar
http://www.megawattmotorworks.com
http://www.whokilledtheelectriccar.com

FLIM: ExxonMobil Expose
http://www.worldoutofbalance.org

OIL SPILL DISASTERS
http://www.betterworldlinks.org/book56w.htm
http://www.sunkills.com
http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/more_info/bp_pipeline.htm
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1105-04.htm
http://bristol.indymedia.org/newswire.php?story_id=25422
http://www.greenpointvexxon.com
http://gcmonitor.org/article.php?id=151
http://whyfiles.org/168oil_spill/index.html
http://www.loe.org/series/exxon/lessons.htm
http://environment.about.com/b/a/256786.htm
http://www.jomiller.com/exxonvaldez/
book: Extreme Conditions, Big Oil and the Transformation of Alaska; author: John Strohmeyer

OIL REFINERY TOXIC POLLUTION
http://www.refineryreform.org

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY - BIG OIL: THE KILLING FIELDS
http://www.studentsforbhopal.org
http://www.bhopal.net/campaigns.html

SOLAR LINKS: USA
http://www.seia.org
http://www.awea.org
http://www.homepower.com/events/index.cfm
http://milwaukee.indymedia.org/en/2006/07/205706.shtml
http://www.phillyimc.org/en/2006/07/25901.shtml
http://rogueimc.org/en/2006/07/6867.shtml

SOLAR LINKS: INTERNATIONAL
http://bristol.indymedia.org/newswire.php?story_id=25168
http://pr.indymedia.org/news/2006/09/18233.php
http://southafrica.indymedia.org/news/2006/06/10619.php

SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGY
http://www.homepower.com
http://istanbul.indymedia.org/news/2006/09/145767.php
http://english-cyprus.indymedia.org/newswire/display/251/index.php
http://athens.indymedia.org/front.php3?lang=en&article_id=570479

shellfacts.com