...
Non essendo per nulla un
esperto di questioni relativi all’economia della produzione del petrolio di
quanto segue posso dire soltanto che, avendo letto diversi suoi articoli, posso
dire soltanto che considero Cyrus Bina uno studioso le cui argomentazioni sono
spesso molto convincenti. E tuttavia questo resta un approccio economicista. L’aver
dimostrato che la guerra all’Iraq non conviene in termini puramente economici
non dimostra ancora che il motivo fondamentale non sia l’appropriazione delle
risorse petrolifere irachene.
Cito qui dalla mia
traduzione di un articolo di Milan
Rai che mette a fuoco con grande esattezza i termini della questione.
Ci
sono qui due problemi: il valore del petrolio iracheno per le corporazioni
statunitensi, e la questione dell’analisi imperiale costo/benefici. Cominciando
dalla seconda questione, durante la storia le potenze imperiali hanno speso più
nelle guerre di conquista e assoggettamento di quanto potessero guadagnare
dalle colonie acquisite o soggiogate. La guerra statunitense in Indocina è uno
stupefacente esempio di quanto i costi economici possano essere sproporzionati
rispetto ai benefici materiali previsti. Il costo dell’impero è sostenuto
dall’intera società, mentre a godere dei benefici dell’impero sono i pochi che
contano. Quindi, in generale, per coloro che fanno politica – coloro che
condividono interessi e punti di vista con chi detiene il potere a livello
nazionale – è del tutto razionale usare le risorse della società per assicurare
gli interessi di ricchi e potenti, anche se le spese eccedono i guadagni
previsti. I costi sono socializzati, i benefici privatizzati. Questa è la
realtà del nostro “libero mercato”.
The
Real Meaning of “No Blood for Oil” Slogan
Copyrights © 2003 Cyrus Bina
All rights reserved
Cyrus Bina
Given all the proven oil reserves of some 110 billion of barrels in Iraq, and the steady production schedules of 2.5 million and 5 million barrel per day respectively, in two scenarios, we may obtain the following results:
- The above reserves, ceteris paribus, might be utilized within some 120 yeas if the production will be set at 2.5 million per day or [2.5 * 365 = 912.5] 912.5 millions of barrels annually OR such reserves shall be exhausted in 60 year if the production schedule increased to 5 million of daily barrels, the equivalent of [5 * 365 = 1,825] 1,825 million of barrels annually;
- Let’s assume $20.00 per barrel for the price oil (viz. the 1990s average market price) and about $10.00 for Persian Gulf oil differential oil rent (see Bina, The Economics of the Oil crisis, 1985 for definition of oil rents);
- Let’s further assume 8% as a non-inflationary discount rate for calculation of our present values, a steady 3% for the rate of inflation and 3% per year for the growth in the volume of the existing proven reserves due to additional discoveries.
I. The calculations according to the first scenario (the annual production of 912.5 million barrels in 120 years, with $10.00 of differential oil rent per barrel) are as follows:
912,500,000 * 120 = 109, 500, 000,000 barrels
109, 500,000,000 * $10 = $1,095,000,000,000
Given 8% annual discount rate, 3% annual rate of inflation, and 3% annual growth rate of the proven reserves, we obtain the following result:
8% - 3% + 3% = 8% of overall discount rate applies;
Thus the
Present Value of $1,095,000,000,000 at 8% for 120 years is: $106,800,000
II. The calculations according to second scenario (the annual production of 1,825 million barrels in 60 years, with $10.00 of differential oil rent per barrel) are as follows:
1,825,000,000 * 60 = 109,500,000,000 barrels
109,500,000,000 * $10 = $1,095,000,000,000
Given 8% annual discount rate, 3% annual rate of inflation, and 3% annual growth rate of the proven oil reserves, we obtain the following result:
8% - 3% + 3% = 8% of overall discount rate applies;
Thus, the
Present Value of $1,095,000,000,000 at 8% for 60 years is:
$10,810,000,000
Hence, given these two scenarios, the price tag for this PRIZE cannot more than $11 billion. Now, let’s assume that the Iraqi oil reserves are underestimated and, say, five times more than the reported figures by OPEC. Then, ceteris paribus, on can multiply the highest figure of $11 billion by 5, thus obtaining a present value of $55 billion. Let’s further assume that our reasonable figure of $10 for differential rent per barrel (obtained from the average oil price of $20 in the 1990s) will be doubled!! Again, we cannot find a figure significantly more than $110 billion as the Iraqi oil price tag $110 billion. Isn’t this a chum change, not to mention the incalculable human cost of war, relatively to the anticipated and unanticipated cost of what the Bush administration has already proposing for the prosecution of war with Iraq and its subsequent period of occupation?
In my judgment, the left has to think seriously about the slogan of “No Blood for Oil.” Optimistically, this slogan refers to the tip of the iceberg; realistically, it is misleading on the cause of the war, this one and the previous one. The cause of war is due to lose of the U.S. hegemony and its historical impossibility of gaining it back (see my “Rhetoric of Oil and the Dilemma of War and American Hegemony,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Summer 1993, 15 (3), pp. 1-20; “Oil, Japan, and Globalization,” Challenge, May/June 1994, 37 (3), pp. 41-48; “On the Sand Castles and Sand-Castle Conjectures: A Rejoinder,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter/Spring 1995, 17 (1&2), pp. 167-171; Globalization: The Epochal Imperatives and Developmental Tendencies,” in Political Economy of Globalization, Gluwer Academic Press, 1997, pp. 41-58). You may call this Bina’s impossibility theorem!!
Tuesday, March 25, 2003
Minnesota, USA
Cyrus Bina, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics and Management
University of Minnesota, Morris
Morris, MN 56267
Phone: (320) 589-6193
Fax: (320) 589-6117
E-mail: binac@mrs.umn.edu
