THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

ovvero:LA CONQUISTA DEL PIANETA TERRA
http://www.newamericancentury.org/aboutpnac.htm

On February 13, AEI Senior Fellow Richard Perle spoke before a large gathering in New York about U.S. policy toward Iraq. After opening with brief a comment on the UN, the inspection process and German and French diplomatic activities, Perle responded to a series of questions put forward by those attending the event. Highlights of his remarks follow:

United Nations

Perle: "I'm not going to try to make the argument for military action to enforce UN resolutions; let me just state that if we fail to do so, if we go from a 17th to an 18th resolution and then a 19th resolution, the UN will continue to dismantle itself, not brick-by-brick, but resolution-by-resolution. At some point, if resolutions are not enforced, they become meaningless, and I'm tempted to suggest that we're already past that point and what's needed now is an urgent rescue of the honor and integrity of the United Nations itself….

"At the end of the day, the United Nations, in Article 51, recognizes the inherent right of self-defense. It doesn't confer that right. That's not the UN's to confer. It recognizes that we all have the right of self-defense and we may from time to time have to act without the approbation of the UN. I think the French went into the Ivory Coast without the United Nations. We and some our allies went into Kosovo without the United Nations. It's not without precedent to act without the United Nations. But if we ever get to the point where we can't defend ourselves because we can't get the other four members of the Security Council to agree, then I think the president will have relinquished his responsibility under the Constitution to provide for the common defense. So we want support in the UN, we want the approbation of the UN, but no American government can allow the defense of this country to depend on a show of hands at the United Nations or anywhere else.

"If that sounds unilateralist, so be it. I think at the end of the day that would be the attitude of France or German or China if they felt that they were threatened in the way that we now consider we are threatened. The fabric of the UN, of the international community, is just not strong enough now that we would be ready to abandon our sovereign right of self-defense in the hope that some other structure is going to protect us."

Inspections

Perle: "In my view, the right thing for Hans Blix to have said and done when, on December 7th, Saddam's regime handed over a false declaration about Iraqi holdings of weapons of mass destruction, was to proclaim that there was no appropriate mission for the inspectors and, therefore, the inspections would not begin until Saddam had done what he is obliged to do under UN resolution 1441, which is account for the differences between an inventory of weapons of mass destruction that had been compiled by the previous UN inspectors and what Saddam claimed to have on hand on December 7th.

"Unfortunately, Hans Blix chose, rather than clarify this point at the outset, to send inspection teams on a fruitless goose chase, returning to sites that had been inspected previously before the expulsion of the inspectors and because they, understandably, returned without having found anything, this created the impression that perhaps there was nothing to be found.

"Let me suggest to you that the inspectors will find nothing of consequence, nothing that Saddam doesn't wish them to find because he controls the territory absolutely, because everything of interest has been hidden and some things of particular interest have even been made mobile so that even if we knew the location, that information would be valid only at the instant at which it was achieved and, therefore, inspections will not produce results, not now, not a month from now, not a year from now, not with the hundred inspectors he now has, not with a thousand inspectors.

"The suggestion that the United Nations can acquit itself and act on its repeated resolutions by granting more time or increasing the number of inspectors -- it is simply a dilatory tactic. It is a tactic for delay, it is a tactic for shirking the responsibilities that the United Nations itself previously accepted."

Germany and France

Perle: "I think it's important to distinguish between German policy and French policy….

"In the German case, there is strong evidence that the Chancellor, in his bid for reelection, tried hard to improve his standing in a group within the German electorate where he was falling below the anticipated numbers. The group, as I understand it, was women in the 25 to 40 age category. The Germans, like us, now conduct their elections with extensive polling. That's the antithesis of leadership and I'm sorry to say we all do it…. So they hit on appealing to the antiwar sentiment, the pacifist sentiment if you will, that was present in that group in the population and more broadly to be fair and there was a little surge in the polls and it was repeated and there was a further surge in the polls and it became the chancellor's policy to elicit the strongest possible constituency among people who were alarmed at the prospect of war, frightened at the prospect of war, opposed to military action to deal with Saddam Hussein, and he painted himself into a corner, a corner so extreme that it became the chancellor's policy that Germany would not participate in a military action against Saddam Hussein even if the United Nations mandated such a doctrine. It was precisely the sort of unilateralism of which the United States is frequently accused: separating himself completely from any possible international consensus.

"Now, the French motivations, I think, are different. Let's be candid about it. France has found a way of dealing with Saddam Hussein that simply wouldn't work for the United States because it entails a degree of cooperation that is not acceptable for us. The commercial relationship between France and Saddam's regime is on hold owing to the sanctions but I think it's clear that the moment the sanctions are removed there is a pipeline of contracts that would be promulgated and they're important for France. We shouldn't kid ourselves, they're important for France. It's my understanding that the Total contract with Saddam is worth $40 billion to $60 billion…. So there are commercial interests and for those people who accuse the United States in being interested in oil in this matter, I submit to you that our interest in oil is in purchasing it on the world market. That could best be accomplished by lifting the sanctions, hardly by going to war against Saddam Hussein. The French interest in the promulgation of contracts that will only go forward with this regime is perfectly obvious.

"But there's a second French attitude that I think we have to come to grips with and understand and that is the desire on the part of France to build the European Union as a counterweight to the United States. Counterweight is the term most frequently employed by the French, by Chris Patten in Brussels and by others. For a long time the United States and France have been allies. Good allies. Vital to each other's security at many times in our history and never in the period in which we were allies who supported one another did either of us think of describing the other as a counterweight. A relationship that can be described by the term counterweight is not a relationship of alliance."

Anti-war Sentiment in Europe

Perle: "I recognize that there is very substantial sentiment against war and there always will be and we should be grateful for that. You know, if in any of our democracies we are ever eager to go to war, that would be a tragedy. The argument has to be made. The balancing of risks has to be sustainable and understandable….

"If the German government does not explain to the German people what is at issue, it's not unreasonable to assume that antiwar sentiment will prevail. In the absence of a serious debate, the default position is opposition to war, of course. But I don't believe that there has been a serious, balanced discussion in Germany about the risks posed by Saddam Hussein….

"It is to the credit of Prime Minister Blair that despite that antiwar sentiment, he is leading in the direction that he believes is right for his country, and this president is leading the United States in the direction that he believes is right for this country. The lesson of history is if leaders don't lead and if they simply follow sentiment, terrible mistakes can be made. The sentiment in the United Kingdom before the last war was so hostile to military action that it even became hostile to military preparations and we saw the result of that. So I make no apology for the fact that public opinion is not solidly behind the thinking of the American president or the British Prime Minister, or [Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio] Berlusconi or [Prime Minister of Spain, Jose Maria] Aznar and others. There is leadership in Europe and there is a failure of leadership in Europe, if I could put it that way….

"There's one other element here and I think we need to recognize that Americans and American leaders feel threatened and recognize the threat we face in a way quite different from others who may not feel or judge the threat in quite the same way, and that's perfectly understandable….

"I would be surprised if someone over coffee and apple cake in Oslo would feel similarly threatened. So we shouldn't expect our European friends and allies to share the sense of apprehension that we have as a result of September 11th. September 11th did something of enormous importance for the sensibility of American policymakers and this President in particular. The lesson of September 11th in my view was that it is possible to wait too long to deal with a known threat. On September 10th we knew what was going on in Afghanistan. We may not have known that Mohammed Atta had already bought a ticket and arrived in this country for the purpose of flying an airplane into the World Trade Center, but we knew that there were thousands of people in camps in Afghanistan being trained for terrorist action against us. We knew that they had carried out terrorist acts in the past. We observed them from space. We heard their conversations. We knew there was a threat and we didn't act….I promise you if we had gone to the world, to our European allies, to say, 'We want to carry out a preventive attack against the Taliban in Afghanistan,' the polls would have been as opposed to that as they are opposed to taking action against Iraq. We would have never had a political consensus in favor of it. So it wasn't even considered. We can no longer tolerate the risks involved in watching threats develop and failing to take action against them, and that's the lesson of September 11th."

Why Now?

Perle: "Well, I don't think we have the luxury of changing priorities from one day to the next. There was a review of Iraq policy underway on September 11th and the administration hadn't decided at that point what to do, but one thing was very clear: the consensus behind the sanctions which had become the central element of western United Nations strategy for dealing with Saddam Hussein was crumbling. France and Russia had already indicated they were opposed to continuing the sanctions. The French wanted to weaken the sanctions regime. The so-called smart sanctions policy of the United States was really a response to the eroding support for those sanctions and it was very clear that if something wasn't done that Saddam was going to emerge the survivor who had outlasted the United Nations….So it was urgent to deal with Iraq, and we set on a course of dealing with Iraq.

"Sometimes the question is put: Why now with Iraq? I think the answer in part is that we're late and we should have done this a long time ago and the fact that we didn't do it a long time ago, the fact that we tolerated the expulsion of the inspectors, was a tribute to weak leadership at the time that that took place…. The Clinton administration chose not to respond or not to respond in a substantial way. That was a terrible mistake….

"[As for the other members of the 'axis of evil'] we have to deal with all three and we'll deal with each in its own way. In the case of Iran, I think that place is going to fall apart because the mullahs are so unpopular. It may take a little while but it's going to happen. In the case of North Korea, we've got an obviously very delicate situation because of the damage that the North Koreans could inflict instantaneously on South Koreans. So we have to be sensitive to South Korean concerns as we deal with it and we have to do things, sometimes, one at a time."

Preemption

Perle: "Let me say a word about what you call the new strategy of preemption. There's nothing new about preemption. If you know that you are about to be attacked, it is certainly sensible if you can act first and avoid that attack to do so. I don't think anybody would dispute that. So then the question is how imminent must the attack be to justify the preemptive response. Here, we need to think more carefully about the concept of imminence. In 1981, the Israelis, after a long and, I gather, a heated cabinet debate, decided to destroy the reactor that Chirac had sent to Osirak, not because it was about to produce nuclear weapons. It wasn't. It was about to produce plutonium and it was under IAEA safeguards so the Iraqis would have had to siphon off small, undetectable quantities of plutonium and it would have taken them time to build a nuclear weapon based on what they would get from the Osirak reactor. But, nevertheless, the Israelis decided to strike some years in advance of the production of the nuclear weapon that they were concerned about.

"Now, why did they do that? They did it because the Iraqis were about to load fuel into the reactor and once they did so, they would not have had an opportunity to use an air strike without doing a lot of unintended damage around the facility, because radioactive material would have been released into the atmosphere. So from an Israeli point of view, what was imminent and what had to be acted against in a preemptive manner was not the ultimate emergence of the threat but an event that would lead inexorably to the ultimate emergence of the threat. They had to deal with a threshold that once crossed, they would no longer have the military option that could be effective at that moment. If we think of imminence in that sense, if we think of it as the thresholds that once crossed will so worsen our situation that we can't allow those thresholds to be crossed, then you start looking at how far are they from achieving the means to do the thing that everyone would recognize we were justified in stopping at the moment that action was taken. In the case of Iraq, we're talking about stopping the further development of nuclear weapons, we're talking about new systems of delivery for the chemical and biological weapons Saddam already has, including systems with much longer range. What is imminent about Iraq and what may be imminent in some other situations requires you to look back and decide when a threat becomes unmanageable."

Terrorism and American Power

Perle: "I don't think so. I think the one thing that would encourage further acts of terror against the United States would be a withdrawal by the United States at this point. If we were to fail to carry forward on the things we've said, we would appear to be what Osama bin Laden says we are and what Saddam Hussein has said we are, which is weak and blustery, a bully. So we have to carry this forward….Weakness is fatal in these matters. We're dealing with people who understand strength and have only contempt for weakness.

"As for the unpopularity of the United States, it's a real problem and it undoubtedly diminishes our ability to do the things that we think are important. I think that's bad for the world because if the United States, as the leader it has always been, has its authority and standing diminished, that can't be good for the Swiss or the Italians or the Germans. But I don't know how you deal with that problem….

"I'm not going to tell you that we get every policy right. We don't. We make lots of mistakes. But by and large I believe that this country expresses as well as you can expect the government in a democracy to express the interests and values of other free societies, and we're in this together. If we're unpopular because we're powerful, I don't know how to avoid that except by becoming less powerful and I can't believe that that's going to help us in the long run….

"We're bound, I think, to be unpopular simply by virtue of the strength of our position. We didn't ask for it that way, but that's the hand history has dealt us and we can't give the cards back."

June 3, 1997

American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks. But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America's role in the world. They have not set forth guiding principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century.

We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.


As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?


We are in danger of squandering the opportunity and failing the challenge. We are living off the capital -- both the military investments and the foreign policy achievements -- built up by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world. And the promise of short-term commercial benefits threatens to override strategic considerations. As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead.

We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.


Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.

Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today. Here are four consequences:

• we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global
responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;


• we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;


• we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;


• we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.

Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.

Elliott Abrams Gary Bauer William J. Bennett Jeb Bush

Dick Cheney Eliot A. Cohen Midge Decter Paula Dobriansky Steve Forbes

Aaron Friedberg Francis Fukuyama Frank Gaffney Fred C. Ikle

Donald Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad I. Lewis Libby Norman Podhoretz

Dan Quayle Peter W. Rodman Stephen P. Rosen Henry S. Rowen

Donald Rumsfeld Vin Weber George Weigel Paul Wolfowitz

Go back to school!

CONOSCERE WOLFOWITZ

Il 9dicembre 2001, il viceministro della Difesa Paul Wolfowitz ha acceso solennemente la “menorah nazionale” (il candelabro a sette braccia) sul Campidoglio. Gli erano al fianco due rabbini Lubavitcher:l’onnipresente Levi Shemtov, il conduttore dei “seminari”politici, e suo fratello, Abraham Shemtov. Scopriamo così dal lirico articolo che il Washington Post dedica all’evento il giorno dopo (titolo: “la calda fiammella della speranza”)che esiste in Usa una “menorah nazionale”.Ovviamente non esiste, poniamo, un presepio nazionale. E nessun ministro americano andrebbe solennemente a visitarlo. Ciò violerebbe il principio della separazione fra stato e religione, in Usa assai rigida. Ma c’è sempre un’eccezione per gli ebrei: Wolfowitz s’è comportato come se l’hassidismo fanatico di cui è devoto fosse la religione di stato. Probabilmente lo è. Come abbiamo appreso dai Lubavitcher, vigono due leggi distinte, una per il popolo eletto e sovrano, l’altra - più coattiva - per gli inferiori noachici. Di fatto, Wolfowitz è famoso per il suo disprezzo di ogni regola e convenzione, internazionale o di stato. Già all’indomani dell’ 11 settembre, il viceministro del Pentagono proclamava che - essendo più che evidenti i legami fra Al-Qaeda e Saddam Hussein, il leader irakeno - bisognava immediatamente attaccare l’Irak. Anzi di più:”Liquidare gli stati che sostengono il terrorismo”,tutti quanti. Per la precisione, tutte le nazioni che possono costituire una minaccia per lo stato ebraico, anche potenziale. Secondo il Village Voice,che al personaggio ha dedicato un sarcastico articolo (21 novembre 2001), Wolfowitz spin-.42

geva “per estendere l’azione militare contro l’Irak, la Siria e il Libano, praticamente identificando così l’interesse nazionale di Israele con quello degli Usa” . Sempre pensoso del bene di Israele, Wolfowitz premeva per mettere anche Arafat nella lista dei terroristi da punire con la forza statunitense, e per azioni “liquidatorie”degli Usa contro Hamas e gli Hezbollah. Wolfowitz è uno stupido, commentava un (anonimo) alto funzionario della Cia interpellato dal Village Voice:”Nell’ambiente dello spionaggio siamo tutti d’accordo che, se vogliamo perseguire davvero la rete di Bin Laden, abbiamo bisogno di informazioni;e per questo dobbiamo lavorare con i nostri alleati [musulmani], e questo richiede cooperazione.Colin Powell ha fatto un buon lavoro in questo senso, mettendo assieme un’ampia coalizione e tenendola unita.Egli capisce benissimo che se colpiamo l’Irak, ogni coalizione si spacca in un nanosecondo.E colpire Hamas o gli Hezbollahsarebbe un terribile errore:[...]né l’uno né l’altro hanno compiuto atti aggressivi contro gli americani, e se li colpiamo, cominceranno a prendere di mira interessi americani”. Fatto è, spiegava il periodico di New York, che Wolfowitz sta cercando di forzare la politica estera americana, spalleggiato da una sua “camarilla” (cabal) al Pentagono. Ne fanno parte il sottosegretario alla Difesa Douglas Feith, i vicesegretari Peter Rodman e J.D. Crouch, il “camerata di sempre di Wolfowitz, Richard Perle”, e i membri dello studio di consulenza militare Defense Policy Board, che Perle presiede; “inoltre, in modo meno visibile, alcuni falchi del Dipartimento di Stato, che sono stati imposti a Colin Powell [ministro degli Esteri], come il sottosegretario John Bolton.Per costoro, gli eventi di dite mesi fa [l’11 settembre] rappresentano quasi un’opportunità da sogno per realizzare il loro programma estremista”. Wolfowitz, Feith, Perle e Bolton sono ebrei. E praticamente tutti ebrei sono i membri della “camarilla”, scatenatisi dopo 1’ 11 settembre a cogliere “l’opportunità da sogno”. RichardPerle, come sappiamo già, presiede il Defense Policy Board, un centro-studi privato (parte anch’esso della molto articolata lobby ebrai-.43

ca) che fornisce, richiesto o no, “consigli”al governo. Il 19-20 settembre, mentre il fumo acre si levava ancora dalle macerie delle due Torri, i centro-studi di Perle tenne una riunione fiume di 19ore cui parteciparono anche DonaldRumsfelde Wolfowitz, ossia il ministro e viceministrc in carica. Ne uscì la proposta di una nuova guerra contro Saddam, e d:frazionare l’Irakin mini-stati etnici. Le proposte furono messe per iscritto, in una “lettera aperta al presidente”, firmata da vari columnist ed “esperti”(primo firmatario, William Kristol, del WeeklyStandard, pos seduto dall’israelita britannico Rupert Murdoch). Nella lettera non s mancava di deridere Colin Powell per il suo sforzo di “costruire una coalizione”di paesi islamici contro il terrorismo. Un’altra lettera aperta fu spedita a Bush da un altro centro di studi strategici, Project for the new american century:i cui membri sono, notò il Vil lage Voice,”glì stessi del Defence PolicyBoard’ ‘. La tesi generale di questi gruppi, ossia della “camarilla”, è la seguente “Ilegami tra Al Qaeda, Saddam, Hamas, Hezbollah, e in pratica ogni altro gruppo islamista, sono chiari e noti hanno bisogno di essere documentati;di qui la necessità di un rapido dispiegamento di bombe, e sé possibile di truppe, in Irak, Siria e Libano”. Dopo l’esplosione del caso dell’antrace (poi risultato originare dal laboratorio militare americano di Fort Detrick), Wolfowitz e i suoi si prodigarono in immediate dichiarazioni pubbliche, per dire che questo fatte “provava”che Saddam era complice di Bin Laden, e reiterava il suo caldo invito a ‘liquidare gli stati che appoggiano il terrorismo, dovunque E

‘ Si noti che il nome di questo centro-studi, “Progetto per il nuovo secolo americano”ha un sapore Lubavitch.

Sappiamo quale progetto il rebbe nutra per il “Nuovo Secolo”Di fatto gli stessi personaggi, capeggiati dal solito

Perle, l’8 luglio 1996 scrissero un documento che “consigliava”all’allora primo ministro di Israele, Ben Netanyahu,

un “taglio netto” (a clean break)con il processo di pace. I suggerimenti comprendevano: l’occupazione e l’annessione

ad Israele della striscia di Gaza e dei West Banks, cos ì ponendo fine ad ogni autonomia palestinese; l’eliminazione di

Saddam Hussein, e in prospettiva la destabilizzazione della Siria, dell’Iran e dell’Arabia Saudita.

1
Village Voice,cit..44

in ogni momento”. A suffragio di questa tesi, citava uno studio di un terzo centro-studi, American Enterprise Institute (indovinate quali membri lo compongono). Colin Powell dovette dichiarare pubblicamente - e lo fece con tagliente laconicità - che Wolfowitz, il vice ministro,”non parla a nome del governo”.

Da più parti si fece notare che quei legami fra il dittatore irakeno e il fanatico saudita non erano affatto provati. Anzi erano praticamente da escludere. A quel punto, attesta il Village Voice, Wolfowitz in persona spedì, a raccogliere le “prove”

mancanti, un membro assai importante del Defence Policy Board:James Woolsey. Già direttore della Cia, Woolsey è anche membro del Council ori Foreign Relations (CFR). È istruttivo sapere che già nel corso del 1998 il CFR aveva condotto un war-game, un “gioco

strategico” simulato, dal titolo altamente significativo:”The next financial crisis: warning

signs, damage contro and impact” 3 .Nel gioco si immaginava che “l’ imminente crisi

finanziaria”’avrebbe coinciso con un acuto allarme-terrorismo (quando si dice la chia- roveggenza);lo scenario utilizzato prevedeva che il presidente fosse liquidato dai terroristi, sicché gli Usa sarebbero stati gestiti da un “comitato di crisi”non eletto. Woolsey aveva partecipato a quella simulazione profetica. Ma di questo dovremo riparlare. Per ordine di Wolfowitz, l’exdirettore della Cia si reca dunque in Gran Bretagna, alla ricerca di “prove”che collegassero uno dei presunti dirottatori del WorldTrade Center, Mohamed Atta (che aveva vissuto in Inghilterra) con lo spionaggio irakeno. Prende contatto con esuli irakeni. Le sue ricerche lo portano nel paesello di Swansea, nel Galles. Ma essere stato direttore della Cia non garantisce di essere un bravo agente sul campo:Woolsey suscita l’attenzione della polizia locale che, a quanto pare, lo ferma. Controllo delle generalità, e incredulo stupore. Il capo della polizia allerta ScotlandYard. Conclusione:l’ambasciata Usa a Londra ri-‘

Executive Intelligente Review, 26 ottobre 2001..45
ceve una richiesta di chiarimento:il dottor Woolsey sta svolgendo le sue indagini in veste ufficiale, o da privato?In tal modo, è dagli inglesi che la Cia e il Dipartimento di Stato vengono a sapere della misteriosa missione di Woolsey. Powell e Tenet (il nuovo capo della Cia) fanno filtrare la storia al Village Voice,nostra preziosa fonte di tutta la vicenda. L’ottimo articolo di Jason Vest, pieno di sarcasmo e di intelligente conoscenza dei retroscena, conclude tuttavia con un’ingenuità. Wolfowitz, dice, è stato “imbavagliato”e forse non nuocerà più. Grave errore:nonostante le gaffes, il goffo intrigo le falsità rivelate e le vere idiozie del gruppo ebraico, il presidente Bush sta attuando precisamente il piano della camarilla Wolfowitz. Mentre è Colin Powell, il moderato, adessere imbavagliato ai margini del governo.”Ci stiamo avviando alla prossima Guerra dei cent’ anni”,annunciò (14 ottobre 2001) un anonimo membro della camarilla (probabilmente Perle) all’ Observer di Londra;e difatti Bush parla di guerra “infinita”, “di durata lunghissima”.I termini sono praticamente gli stessi. Arafat,”da liquidare”secondo Wolfowitz, ha “deluso profondamente”Bush che non lo crede più un interlocutore valido. Eccetera. Ma chi è l’origine di quella terminologia di guerra-apocalisse?Il 29ottobre 2001 il già citato American Enterprise Institute (uno dei centri-studi di Perle e della lobby ebraica) ha tenuto una giornata di discussione. Moderata da Perle, la riunione ha visto la presenza di Michael Leeden. Una presenza illuminante per sé:ebreo, Leeden è stato coinvolto in non chiari affari di intelligente;in anni non troppo lontani ha abitato in Italia, dov’era diventato un esperto del “terrorismo rosso”;più tardi, ha collaborato alla Biblical Review,una rivista molto interessata alle ricerche “archeologiche”sull’esatta ubicazione del “Tempio”ebraico di Gerusalemme, allo scopo di tentare di ricostruirlo (scopo di parecchi gruppi fondamentalisti ebraici). Che cosa dice Leeden all’ American Enterprise?Ecco le sue frasi esatte.”Basta coi

compromessi. Questa è guerra totale. Combattiamo una quantit à di nemici diversi, e ce ne

sono a quintali. E tutto questo dire: be’ ,

45.46
prima andiamo in Afghanistan, poi finiremo l’Irak, poi ci guardiamo attorno a vedere com’è la situazione, questo è il modo più sbagliato di affrontare la cosa.Perché questi [i terroristi e gli stati islamici] si parlano l’un l’altro e lavorano tutti insieme. Dobbiamo semplicemente applicare la nostra visione del mondo, adottarla integralmente, e non tentare di essere intelligenti e rappezzare intelligenti soluzioni diplomatiche, ma sferrare una guerra totale contro questi tiranni:tutto andrà molto bene, e i nostri figli canteranno canzoni sulla nostra azione fra anni ed anni ancora” ‘ .

È, quasi parola per parola, lo stesso discorso che abbiamo trovato nei testi dei Lubavitch. La guerra totale, la guerra finale. La guerra messianica. Inutile fare alleanze, perché nell’era del messia Israele non ha da fare concessioni. Il successo è assicurato dall’alto. Agli eroi di quest’epoca si canteranno inni. E la politica degli Stati Uniti - all’insaputa dei cittadini, i goym che moriranno nella guerra dei cent’anni - è guidata completamente da questo spirito, da questo millenarismo paranoide.