http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:vottjWy89bgJ:http://www.igd.org.za/pub/papers/civilwar.doc+eni+sudan+oil+italian&hl=it&client=firefox-a
February 2000
THE CIVIL WAR IN SUDAN:
The role of the oil industry
Shannon Field
Associate Researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue
IGD OCCASIONAL PAPER NO 23
Published by:
The Institute for Global Dialogue
P O Box 32571
Braamfontein 2017 South Africa
Tel: (27) 011-339 6585
Fax: (27) 011-339 6616
Website: http://www.igd.org.za
ISBN:1-919697-45-4
©IGD
Series Editors
Garth le Pere
Solani Ngobeni
INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE
MISSION
The Institute for Global Dialogue is an independent South African non-governmental organisation that provides policy analysis on the changing global environment and its impact on South Africa for the benefit of government and civil society.
CORE PROGRAMMES
The activities of the Institute centre around four programme areas:
1.
Africa Dialogue
This programme aims to promote second-track dialogue on African countries and regions experiencing crises of governance, with a view to (i) providing concerned parties with a platform for discussion and (ii) recommending appropriate courses of action to the South African government and civil society.
2. Multilateral Analysis
This programme aims to analyse multilateral institutions as they influence global processes of change with a view to understanding their impact on South Africa and the global South.
3. Foreign Policy Analysis
This programme aims to provide policy analysis and recommendations on South Africa’s foreign relations to the South African government, parliament, and civil society.
4. Southern Africa
This programme aims to analyse and promote and understanding of factors that advance or hinder regional co-operation, sustainable development, and security in southern Africa.
CONTENTS
MAP
PREFACE 1
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN 2
1. The legacy of colonialism
2. Elite domination
3. From elite domination to Holy War
OIL AND THE SUDANESE ECONOMY 4
1. Sudan’s debt burden
2. Revenue needed to fund the war
3. Expected oil revenue
4. Oil reserves and production capacity
OIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 7
1. Early exploration
2. Oil discovery and its implications
3. The Canadian debut
4. US exclusion form Sudan’s oil industry
5. US policy towards Sudan
6. The formation of the Greater Nile Oil Project
TALISMAN ENERGY OF CANADA 12
1. An issue of trust
2. Advantages of Canadian involvement
3. A potentially lucrative deal
4. Shareholder concerns
THE CHINA NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY 14
1. China’s need for oil
2. A mutually beneficial venture
3. Chinese trade and investment
4. A loyal ally
PETRONAS OF MALAYSIA 18
1. Economic ties
2. Alleged arms transfers
OIL-RELATED CONFLICT 19
1. Protection of the oilfields - an NIF priority
2. Forging alliances
3. Dividing the opposition
4. Divide and rule - even among allies
5. The new pipeline and the prospect of associated conflict
THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF OIL-RELATED CONFLICT 24
1. Land clearances
2. Limited access for humanitarian organisations
THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 28
1. The peace process
2. Sudan in South African foreign policy
ANNEXES 33
BIBLIOGRAPHY 34
PREFACE
The conflict and civil war in the Sudan in its various dimensions and complexities is one of the enduring tragedies of the African continent. Since its independence from Anglo-Egyptian rule in 1956, the country has hardly experienced the necessary stability to entrench constitutional government. Other than two civilian interregnums from 1964 to 1969 and from 1986 to 1989, the country’s politics has been dominated by military intrigue and coups. Military strongmen have aggravated the main cause of a protracted civil war, namely, historic tensions which exist between the Muslim north and the racially, religiously and culturally distinct south. The problem of insurgent southern provinces fighting an internally divided war of liberation has thus led to a sequence of political impasses and failed peace initiatives.
A fundamental problem of governance in the Sudan has been the tyranny of religious intolerance. The imposition of strict Islamic law in 1983 by Sudan’s first coup-maker, Gen. Gaafar Nimeri, provoked the ire and contempt of the largely Christian and animist south, lending new impetus to rebellion and insurrection against the rule of the north which had first broken out at independence. Despite a nominal agreement in 1972 to grant a measure of regional autonomy to the three southern provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile, the deadweight of oppressive northern hegemony fuelled the emergence in 1984 of organised resistance in the south in the form of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army was soon able to establish substantial territorial gains over large parts of Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile, setting the stage for the unfolding human tragedy which has so scarred Sudan’s national life. Matters hardly improved under the second military government of Lt-Gen. Omar al-Bashir who came to power in a bloodless coup in mid-1989. Notwithstanding his declared intention to make the resolution of the conflict with the south the primary aim of his Revolutionary Command Council, Al-Bashir’s authoritarian impulses saw the abolition of the Constitution, the National Assembly, political parties and trade unions.
The new Khartoum government, despite repeated attempts at introducing political reforms, solidified its grip on power by pursuing an Islamist agenda with greater vigour than its military predecessor. This only served to deepen the alienation of the fractious south and escalate an already ruinous war. Adding to the conflict’s seeming intractability is that ongoing internally-led and regionally-brokered peace initiatives failed to produce any meaningful results. This paper by Shannon Field, which has its origins as a field report to Medicins Sans Frontiers, is a depressing but necessary exposition of the complexities which drive the conflict. But it introduces a new variable and focuses attention on the crippling effect which the discovery of and lucrative returns on large oil reserves have on the conflict. The paper meticulously analyses the role of foreign oil companies and national government oil consortiums as directly and indirectly implicated in fomenting an international humanitarian disaster with few recent parallels. It is perhaps symptomatic of how strategic natural resources can determine alliances and shape allegiances in countries at war. Oil and diamonds in Angola and the abundant mineral wealth of the Congo are other examples of the same phenomenon. The IGD publishes this gripping account of a story not well understood nor widely publicised in the hope that it will spur debate and action among concerned governments, international agencies and non-governmental organisations. But we hope especially that South Africans of all persuasions and stations will make the Sudan part of their universe of concerns.
Garth le Pere: Executive Director-IGD
INTRODUCTION
Sudan, the largest country in Africa, has endured the longest civil war on the continent after forty years of intermittent fighting. The Sudanese people have witnessed transitions including three parliamentary democracies and three periods of military rule.1 Two million people have died in the past 16 years of civil war, and twice as many have been displaced, making this one of the greatest humanitarian disasters, and one of the least reported. The war has claimed more lives than the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Somalia combined.2 The specific focus of this report is on the impact of the oil industry on the civil war in Sudan. This report follows the inauguration of Sudan’s 1600 km oil pipeline, the longest in Africa, which has rejuvenated oil operations and heightened expectations of oil revenues flowing to the government of Sudan.
To put the current war in context, this report will begin by providing a background to the conflict. The importance of oil within the context of the Sudanese economy will be addressed, and the impact of ongoing oil exploration and production will be examined. The relationship between the major partners in Sudan’s oil consortium and the government of Sudan is of particular interest, as well as their role and stake in the industry. A key part of the report will look at the extent to which the government of Sudan has attempted to control and protect oil operations by implementing strategies of divide and rule and fomenting conflict between various groups. The humanitarian impact of such actions has been devastating to local populations and is documented in detail.
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
In the early eighties, it was discovered that Sudan may be sitting on 1 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. Some analysts suggest that the control of this resource became a root cause of the on-going conflict in the country. The existence of oil reserves and a rejuvenated oil industry is certainly an important factor which plays a large role in the war, but it should not be misunderstood as a root cause of the conflict. The oil industry appears, however, to be an element which perpetuates conflict in the country, and provides less incentive for a negotiated settlement.3
1.The legacy of colonialism
To understand the current situation in Sudan, it is necessary to briefly look at the colonial legacy which entrenched Northerners in the state apparatus and left the South virtually undeveloped. Sudan was under Anglo-Egyptian rule between 1898 and 1956, and, during that time, the economic policies of the colonial authorities concentrated investment between the two Niles. Large areas of real estate were reserved for the religious aristocracy by colonial authorities, in addition to agricultural land and government contracts, all in an attempt to protect the interests of sectarian families.4 Throughout the country development was uneven and the South was treated as a closed district, particularly in the 1930s and 1940s when the British barred travelling to the South by Northerners without a permit. Southerners had little voice in the running of the country, with no public participation to speak of.5 This legacy created a situation of elite domination in which the Northern elite would go to great lengths to protect their power and position.
2. Elite domination
After independence from colonial rule in 1956, much of the open conflict that broke out between groups in the North and South was the result of the North striving to exert its dominance over the South. Those in the South were fighting against political marginalisation, economic neglect and cultural domination. While efforts on the part of the North to Arabise and Islamise the South began at independence, these strategies had more to do with ensuring control over the various groups in the country than religious zealotry. A brief respite in the fighting occurred in 1972 with the Addis Ababa peace agreement, which allowed the South to have an elected regional assembly, making it an island of democracy within the autocratic Sudanese state.6 This autonomy disturbed the internal stability of the regime and denied Khartoum immediate control over, or easy access to, the South’s mineral and oil wealth. This became problematic for the North as the nation’s economic crisis deepened. As a result, the Northern powers attempted to redraw the borders between North and South, which was unsuccessful, and subsequently created a new province, removing the oilfields altogether from Southern jurisdiction.7
3. From elite domination to holy war
The civil war was re-launched in 1983 when the Sudanese government imposed Sharia law on the whole country, which was unacceptable to many in the South. The coup of 1989, that introduced a military regime led by religious extremists of the National Islamic Front (NIF) was a turning point in Sudanese history. The party had earlier been known as the Muslim Brothers, and these new rulers managed to transform the conflict in Sudan from one based primarily on class interests into one of religious struggle and holy war. The NIF government was intent on establishing a theocratic state, even to the extent of exporting its version of Islam to neighbouring countries. From 1989, the nature of the state changed, with religious fanatics propelled to positions of power. Between 1989 and 1994, 73 000 professionals were dismissed to make way for religious extremists.8 The goal of the government of Sudan was to make 1 mn square miles of Sudan an Islamic state. This vision of the country is different from that held by many in both the North and South who are fighting for a secular and democratic state.9
OIL AND THE SUDANESE ECONOMY
1. Sudan’s debt burden
To understand the significance of oil and the revenue it generates, it is necessary to examine this resource in the context of the Sudanese economy. The potential oil revenues on offer to the NIF is a fresh injection of cash at a time when the state is broke and the debt burden is 250 per cent of Sudan’s estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The debt currently stands at US$20 bn and the government cannot secure loans from outside creditors anymore.10 In 1997, Sudan was almost expelled from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for failing to pay its arrears. Since then the IMF has maintained a presence in Khartoum to pressurise the government to implement economic reforms, cut the deficit, lower inflation, and privatise state companies. The current monthly interest payments on Khartoum’s loans total $4.5 mn.11
2. Revenue needed to fund the war
It is difficult to meet debt payments when the regime is spending an estimated $1 mn a day to fund the war effort.12 The government cannot continue to fund its war effort if it also intends to honour its interest payments and run its economy, which is presently stagnant. The economy is reliant on agriculture, with the main exports including cotton, livestock, sugar and Arabic gum. Sudan has recently experienced the near collapse of its rural economy, with cotton production falling to one third the level of production in the 1980s.13 New oil revenues will thus provide a cash windfall, which will allow the government to fund its war and purchase new military hardware, which is likely to tip the military balance in its favour. The greater availability of oil will also solve the military’s problem of fuel shortages, which have constrained the number of military raids the airforce has been able to carry out. If the government feels that this new revenue will enable it to win the war outright, then it places the regime in a bullish position, making it more likely to rescind from negotiations.
3. Expected oil revenue
The oil revenues do not present a substantial amount of money, but their importance lies in the fact that it is an influx of hard currency which virtually equals the amount of money the government is currently spending on the war. The Sudanese minister of state at the Ministry of Energy, John Dore, recently said that Sudan would earn $200-$300 mn a year from oil exports, which would help the government pay its oil import bill.14 More than a quarter of the country’s total imports is oil.15 The country’s local consumption needs (both civilian and military) are approximately 50,000 barrels of oil per day. Domestic oil production will allow Sudan to import less oil and rely on its own reserves for local consumption. Whether or not the government will use the oil revenues directly for military spending is inconsequential as the available cash will ultimately enable it to continue funding the war. Islamic leader Hassan al-Turabi, who is the Speaker of the National Assembly and Secretary-General of the ruling National Congress, said on April 30, 1999 that the Sudanese government would use earnings on oil exports to finance factories which the government is building to produce tanks and missiles. ‘ We are currently building several factories to produce our needs in weapons, and we plan to manufacture tanks and
missiles to defend ourselves against conspirators’, Turabi said.16 The profits from oil revenues will be moderate for the first ten years, as the government will need to pay back its creditors. The Sudanese government is pleased at the 80 per cent rise in oil prices over the past couple of months.17 The first export shipment of oil from Sudan is expected in the third quarter of 1999.18
4. Oil reserves and production capacity
The Sudanese government is counting on production of 150,000 barrel per day in 2000, which is likely to increase steadily over time. The new $1 bn oil pipeline, which was recently completed between the Heglig oilfields and Baishir, South of Port Sudan, has the capacity of carrying 450,000 barrel per day if booster stations are added.19 It should be noted that the smaller oil pipeline between the Unity field and Heglig concession has not yet been completed, and will delay the flow of oil from Unity field reaching the Red Sea. Given that the known commercial oil reserves amount to 800 mn barrels, if 100,000 barrels are exported per day without disruption, then there will be enough oil to be pumped for 16 years. It should be remembered that there are large areas of southern Sudan where oil is suspected to exist but has yet to be explored. The three main oilfields at present are the Heglig oilfield which is situated in southern Darfur and southern Kordofan, Unity oilfield in the Bentiu area of Unity state, and Adar oilfield in Western Upper Nile. Oil production at the Adar field has been temporarily suspended due to fighting between rival militias in the area, but the field is capable of producing 20,000 barrels per day. Unity oilfield is producing an average of 35,000 barrels per day and Heglig field 25,000 barrels per day.20 Both the Unity and Heglig fields could produce 50,000 barrels per day respectively. The government of Sudan hopes that with exploration drilling it can raise its production capacity to 270,000 barrels per day within one year.21
OIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
1. Early exploration
To understand the oil industry in Sudan today and how far it has progressed since oil exploration began in 1959, it is useful to trace the history of upstream oil activity and identify the key players involved. Numerous multinational companies have been tempted by the prospect of lucrative oil wealth in Sudan, but it took twenty years before the first oil was discovered in 1979. Before this much of the oil exploration took place offshore in the Red Sea, and was undertaken by companies such as Italian Agip Mineraria, Oceanic Oil company, Texas Eastern Company and Union Texas. The results of this exploration were largely negative except for a gas find by Chevron, 120 km south east of Port Sudan in 1974. Oil exploration began in the south west of Sudan in 1975, with Chevron acquiring a concession in the Muglad and Melut basins.
2. Oil discovery and its implications
The most significant oil discovery came in 1980 when the Unity oilfields, two hours North of Bentiu was discovered. A year later, another major discovery was the Adar oilfield, which was drilled by Qatar’s Gulf Petroleum Corporation, Concorp and Sudapet. The third significant oil discovery was that of the Heglig field in 1982, 70 km north of Unity field. The early eighties thus saw numerous discoveries of lucrative natural resources, especially in a country heavily reliant on agriculture for hard currency earnings. The significance of these discoveries was not lost on the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) which had re-launched the armed struggle against the North in 1984, following the imposition of Islamic Sharia law by the Khartoum regime. Oil operations became a primary target for rebels who were intent on weakening the government and denying it of resources. In 1984, the SPLA attacked the oil operations of Chevron in Unity field, killing three employees, and prompting Chevron to abandon its $800 mn investment in the area and pull out of Sudan.22 This incident has not been easily forgotten by oil companies, which have since entered into oil operations in the midst of the war.
3. Canadian involvement
In 1992, the Sudanese company Concorp bought Chevron’s concession and subsequently sold it to the Khartoum government. The NIF then sold this concession in 1994 to a Canadian-based company called State Petroleum Company, which was shortly thereafter bought by Canada’s Arakis Energy. Arakis was taken over by Talisman Energy in 1998, Canada’s largest independent oil and gas producer. Talisman is also the third largest independent oil producer in the world.23 Arakis had not been able to raise the $400 mn it was obliged to pay to the oil consortium for its share of the pipeline costs. It relied on a $750 mn financial deal with a Saudi Arabian investment group that fell through, sending shares plummeting. Talisman offered greater financial backing to the Greater Nile Oil Project (GNOP) and Arakis shareholders agreed to a friendly takeover.
4. US exclusion from Sudan’s oil industry
With the exit of Chevron, American influence in the oil industry in Sudan has been minimal. Many American companies were dissuaded from pursuing any oil interests in Sudan after it was blacklisted with seven other African countries under the 1996 Anti-terrorism Act, along with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea and Libya. The law banned any financial transactions between American corporations and countries supporting terrorism. After aggressive lobbying of the Clinton administration by Canadian oil executives who wanted American partners to develop oilfields in Sudan, the White House made a special exemption for Sudan. California-based Occidental Petroleum Corporation, a big financial supporter of the Democrats, had been seeking a stake in the billion dollar oil deal of which Arakis Energy of Canada was a part. It was Arakis’ Chief Executive Officer John Mcleod who had lobbied the White House to exempt Sudan from the act in order to secure Occidental’s participation in the oil project.24 Ironically, it was the Khartoum government which excluded Occidental from participating because it was concerned about American presence in the oil areas when the Clinton administration was providing military assistance to Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, who were supporting the rebels in Sudan.25
5. US policy towards Sudan
Since the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 1996, the US administration was targeted by other lobbyists on the payroll of companies such as Arakis in an effort to soften America’s foreign policy towards Sudan. One notable example is the campaign of Ijaz Monsoor to influence American policy-makers and promote engagement with the NIF regime. Ijaz Monsoor was on the advisory board of Arakis before it was taken over by Talisman, and is also the Chairman of a private New York firm, Crescent Investment Management. Monsoor is particularly interested in new oil field development and seeks to further his business interests through changes in US policy towards Islamic countries, particularly Sudan. The Washington Post’s David Ottaway documented direct fundraising activities on the part of Ijaz Monsoor for the Democratic Party. During the Clinton/Gore campaign in 1996, Monsoor raised $525,000 for the Democratic Party, $250,000 coming from his own personal funds, and $200,000 from a private fund-raiser he held for Al Gore.26 As a result of his fundraising activities, Monsoor was able to exert influence and gain access to top administration officials, urging individuals such as National Security Advisor Samuel Berger to adopt a policy of constructive engagement towards Sudan.27 Monsoor also testified before the US Congress against the imposition of economic sanctions against Sudan in 1997. This type of behind the scenes lobbying is important because it reveals the extent to which a Canadian oil company operating in Sudan attempted to influence the foreign policy of a world power towards the government of Sudan.
The US congress has recently toughened its stance on Sudan. This may bring more pressure to bear on the government in Khartoum and create negative publicity for the foreign oil companies currently operating in Sudan. On June 15, 1999, the US House of Representatives passed Resolution 75 by a vote of 416-1, declaring the Khartoum government’s conduct in the civil war in the south of Sudan to be genocidal.28 In addition to such a pronouncement, US lawmakers said on 27 July that they plan to introduce a bipartisan bill in the Senate that they hope will help bring an end to the 16-year civil war ravaging Sudan. The proposed Senate bill would strengthen economic sanctions against Khartoum until the government makes credible progress toward a verifiable peace agreement. The bill would also try to end Sudan’s veto authority over famine relief flights by creating contingency plans and alternative routes for delivering humanitarian aid to
regions hit by famine. The US policy towards Sudan, together with the Khartoum government’s
attitude towards American companies, has ensured that US multinational oil companies are excluded from the oil industry in Sudan for the time being.
However, US policy has not deterred other foreign multinationals from filling the vacuum, and in recent months companies have been clamoring to ensure a stake in the exploration and development of oil fields which hold great promise. Some industry analysts estimate that Sudan could have 12.5 bn barrels of undiscovered oil, which would make it one of the world’s largest oilfields.29 Even oil giants like France’s TOTAL Oil are contemplating resuming oil development in Sudan, specifically in the South’s Block B concession which TOTAL abandoned in 1984.30
6. The formation of the Greater Nile Oil Project
The main oil consortium which is responsible for oil production and exploration in Sudan is the Greater Nile Oil Project (GNOP) which is comprised of four companies that control 12.2 mn acres of concession land. The China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) has the largest stake with 40 per cent, followed by Malaysia’s Petronas Carigali with 30 per cent, Canadian-based Talisman Energy with 25 per cent, and Sudan’s National Oil Company, Sudapet with 5 per cent. Sudapet’s small stake in the consortium can be attributed to the fact that the Sudanese do not have the skills or resources to warrant them to assume a larger role, but Sudapet would like to maintain a presence in the consortium to increase its knowledge on oil production and operations. The consortium is committed to drilling 30 new development wells and 21 exploration wells. These companies have had to borrow huge sums of money from international commercial banks to finance the project. Approximately $1 bn was invested in building the oil pipeline, and another $600 mn in building an oil refinery 70 km north of Khartoum at al-Jayli. Other foreign companies have also been responsible for covering start up costs with the promise of a share in future oil revenues. The Chinese have been heavily involved in supplying and laying the pipeline, while the Argentineans have been responsible for telecommunications, the Germans have provided equipment, and the British have supplied power generators.31
Other companies such as the International Petroleum Company (IPC) of Canada have been
operating in areas congruent to those of the GNOP, primarily undertaking oil exploration activities. IPC is a subsidiary of the Swedish-based Lundin Oil, and has a 40 per cent stake in Block 5A which lies near the Heglig field where Talisman is operating. The other partners in Block 5A are Petronas of Malaysia with 28 per cent, OMV of Austria with 27 per cent, and Sudapet with 5 per cent. One of the most recent accomplishments of the Block 5A consortium was the completion in May 1999 of the drilling and logging of Thar Jath oil well, which is a large and well defined prospect. To date, the operations in Block 5A have been low key and not subject to the same kind of attention which the operations and partners of the GNOP have received. This is primarily due to the fact that Block 5A operations are largely confined to exploration, and without a mandate to produce oil, the operations have not been highly controversial or the target of rebel attack.
It should also be noted that the Netherlands-based Trafigura Beheer BV recently won a three-month oil marketing contract with the GNOP, and will handle the initial sales and promotion of Nile Blend crude from Greater Nile’s concession in southern Sudan. Trafigura won the bids from Vitol SA of Switzerland, Arcadia Group PLC of the United Kingdom and Swiss trading firm Glencore International AG among others.32
The formation of the Greater Nile Oil Project has been briefly described, but a comprehensive overview of the oil industry in Sudan would not be complete without analysing, in detail, the relationship between the three main consortium partners and the NIF. Each company has its own agenda, as does the government of Sudan and the partners not only have specific roles to play in the development of the oilfields but each brings different expertise, which are essential to the project. International competition for stakes in the consortium was fierce, with many multinationals vying for a part in the project. The choice of the government of Sudan as to which companies would be responsible for oil production was strategic in many ways and, in addition to criteria such as experience, expertise and resources, the government selected partners it felt it could trust. The Chinese, Malaysians and Canadians were three partners who met these criteria.
TALISMAN ENERGY OF CANADA
1. The advantages of Canadian involvement
The major advantage of having Arakis/Talisman holding a 25 per cent stake in the GNOP was Canadian oil exploration and production technology, which was desperately needed to find the oil. Canadian oil companies have an excellent reputation for finding oil with advanced technology, which is the type of expertise the CNPC could not offer. The Sudanese also needed the Canadians to overcome the processing difficulties posed by Sudanese oil, and the logistical demands in getting the oil to port.33 In addition, the Canadian company provided technical and managerial skills which were invaluable to the Sudanese. Talisman has provided the much needed financial backing to the oil project which Arakis had not been able to muster. At the time of the takeover, Talisman invested $500 mn dollars in the project.34
2. An issue of trust
In addition to the technical expertise that made Arakis and the Talisman a valuable partner in the oil project, the government of Sudan had personal connections with top executives in Arakis that they trusted. This was a key factor when entering into a joint venture in the context of a civil war. Senior figures in the NIF had friendly relations with the Chair of the Board of Arakis, Lutfer Khan, an astute businessman of Pakistani origin. The NIF Minister for External Security, Qutbi Mahdi, had been instrumental in brokering the oil production sharing deal with Lutfer Khan of State Petroleum Company. Qutbi Mahdi was familiar with Canadian circles as he studied at a Canadian university. Mahdi had also personally invited Petronas to be involved in the oil consortium, and had met with former deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ebrahim. Mahdi believed that Khan was supportive of the government in Khartoum and Khan went out of his way to make this point. When the NIF sold Chevron’s oil concession to State Petroleum Company, Lutfer Khan sealed the deal by arranging the marriage of his son to the daughter of former NIF Finance Minister Abdel Rahim Hamdi.35 Hamdi is considered to be an old guard member of the
NIF, who had been the editor of the Muslim Brotherhood newsletter in the 1960s. Hamdi eventually sat on the advisory committee of the board of Arakis.36 Khan also hired the Sudanese Minister of Energy’s two brothers to run his oil companies. The links between top NIF officials and State Petroleum Company can be traced back prior to its official involvement in the Sudan oil industry. It was the NIF Minister for External Security, Qutbi Mahdi, who had been instrumental in brokering the oil production sharing deal with Lutfer Khan of State Petroleum, when the NIF sought to bring the Canadian-based company on board.
Apart from these personal connections, Arakis had proven a loyal partner on the ground in Sudan. Before Arakis was taken over by Talisman, Arakis spokesperson Kristine Dow admitted to the Toronto Star’s Middle East reporter that Arakis had serviced broken military trucks of the NIF. Arakis not only provided electricity lines to NIF military barracks, but also piped water into army camps.37
3. A potentially lucrative deal
While Talisman’s involvement provides obvious advantages to the oil project, the venture is also considered highly lucrative for Talisman itself. The Sudan project is expected to fuel strong rates of growth in volumes and cash flow over the next several years that would be difficult to achieve in Canadian domestic fields for a company the size of Talisman.38 Industry forecasts predict that the production from the project will increase from 32,000 barrels per day in 1999 to 150,000 barrels per day in 2000, 165,000 barrels per day in 2001, and 190,000 barrels per day in 2002.39 Sudan is one of Talisman’s four main operations, the others being in Indonesia, the North Sea and Canada. Companies the size of Talisman are currently facing the prospect of their growth stalling or at least being difficult to sustain, and thus many are establishing an international presence. Talisman has been successful at making the transition, and international production is expected to account for 50 per cent of the company’s production in 1999.40 Talisman’s shares have been at their highest levels yet this July at around CAN$43 a share, compared to CAN$22 when
Talisman first took over Arakis.41 The investment community has appeared supportive of Talisman’s operations in Sudan, with the general view that it is a solid company. While the project in Sudan certainly carries with it a higher risk factor, this seems to have been largely overlooked by investors. It should be noted that the third largest Canadian institutional shareholder in Talisman is the Ontario Teachers Pension Fund, which holds 4.5 mn shares valued at $122.4 mn.
4. Shareholder concerns
There are Talisman shareholders, however, who have been less enthusiastic about Talisman’s involvement in the Sudan, such as church groups which hold in excess of 100,000 shares.42 Eleven churches and religious orders from Canada and the US, which hold Talisman shares, have expressed their concern that the company may be materially aiding the Sudanese government in its civil war and the violation of human rights. This is a controversial issue, which has been fanned by media coverage across Canada and demonstrations against Talisman by local Canadian lobby groups. Talisman has responded to these allegations by arguing that development in general is better than continued stagnation, and is welcomed in the areas of Sudan in which the company operates. The President and CEO of Talisman, Jim Buckee, has also noted that oilfield development in central Sudan was underway before the Canadians arrived, and would proceed without the Canadians if need be. It has been argued that the oil project is better off with Talisman’s participation because there will be stronger western influences and the introduction of Canadian standards in the areas of health, safety and the environment. Despite some negative publicity, Talisman continues to plan the expansion of its operations in Sudan and is enthusiastic about its role in the oil consortium in future. The production sharing agreement that Talisman has with the government in Khartoum has a term of 25-years for the exploration blocks and a 20-year term for the development block, all of which commenced in November 1996. Both have five-year renewal options. The consortium will also own and operate the pipeline for 15-years.43
CHINA NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY
The relationship between China and the NIF is probably one of the most significant factors to consider when analysing the oil industry in Sudan. The economic collaboration between the two
countries in terms of trade, the development of the oil industry, infrastructure and financial assistance have escalated to such an extent that China appears to have become one of Khartoum’s greatest allies. It is very much a symbiotic relationship, China is in desperate need of a secure source of oil in the long-term, while Sudan needs the external credit, investment and market for its oil. This relationship should be of concern to forces attempting to push forward the peace process in Sudan, as China has a vested economic interest in making sure the NIF stays in power. The Sudanese government is very much indebted to the Chinese government at the moment, and has also brokered oil deals with the Chinese whereby they will be repaid for their substantial investment in the oil industry in the form of future oil deliveries. The SPLA has made it clear that it would not honour these oil deals or repay debts incurred by the government in Khartoum if it were to gain political control over southern Sudan.
1. China’s need for oil
The extent to which China needs oil as a resource goes a long way towards explaining its strong ties with the Khartoum government and its desire for Sudan’s promising oil reserves. The reality that China faces is that it will need to become a net importer of oil by the year 2000 if it is going to continue with its modernisation plans. China is rich in oil resources, producing over 150 mn tons of crude oil annually. It also has verified total oil deposits of 17 bn tons.44 China’s petroleum development strategy is to rely mainly on domestic resources, while speeding up Sino-foreign cooperation in exploring Western China and offshore oil and gas resources. A major strategy is to step up efforts to tap international oil markets.45 China plans to turn out 10 mn tons of crude oil through its overseas production by the turn of the century. By the year 2010, China will try to develop an annual overseas oil production capacity of 50 mn tons, in addition to an annual gas supply of 50 bn cubic meters from abroad.46 The CNPC has successfully obtained the shareholding, operational and leasing rights of oilfields in Peru, Canada, Thailand, Kuwait, Venezuela and some other countries. In the coming years, China is expected to develop transitional oil production focusing on the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia.
2. A mutually beneficial venture
The significance of CNPC’s operations in Sudan is that it is the largest oilfield construction project China has undertaken overseas, as well as one of the largest co-operative oil projects in the world. Recently, the CNPC shelved two of its largest overseas projects: a $1.2 bn production sharing agreement with Iraq and a $3.5 bn pipeline project to move Kazakhstan oil to China.47 China’s operations in Sudan will help to improve its expertise in drilling oil inland. The GNOP is important to China not necessarily for the value of the oil that will be produced, but for what the oil represents. The Heglig and Unity oilfields represent a stable source of oil which is necessary in China’s drive to modernise.
As valuable as the oil project is for China, China’s involvement is equally beneficial to Sudan. Just as Canada brings to the consortium its expertise and oil technology, China brings extensive knowledge and experience in pipeline and oil refinery construction. China has built numerous pipelines in the past, and is currently involved in building a gas pipeline in Thailand, transnational oil and gas pipelines in Turkmenistan, as well as oil refineries in Kuwait and Malaysia. China can also provide its own labour for the construction of a major pipeline such as the one in Sudan. Approximately 7,000 Chinese labourers have been engaged in the Sudan oil project, many laying pipeline in what some describe as the most hostile conditions known to man.48 Reports have surfaced that at least 2,000 of the Chinese labourers are prisoners who have been promised a reduction of their sentences in exchange for their labour.49 It has also been reported that 20,000 Chinese labourers, with probable military training, are to be used to protect China’s investment in the oil project.50 China completed the oil pipeline on schedule and this was appreciated by the NIF regime and confirmed China’s commitment to the oil industry in Sudan.
3. Chinese trade and investment
China has invested heavily in the country. It has initiated $20 bn worth of development and infrastructure projects involving dams, hydroelectric power stations, textile mills and agricultural schemes. It has also promised to contribute $750 mn in the construction of the new Khartoum International Airport, and another $750 mn for a new dam on the Nile, near the Northern
province.51 Approximately $100 mn has been spent by the Chinese on textile plants, and $500 mn on a recently constructed oil refinery. China has also provided Sudan with over $12 mn in soft loans to fund a fishing project in the Red Sea.52 Other economic ties have involved arms transfers between Beijing and Khartoum. China has supplied the Khartoum government with arms since 1985, with transfers between 1985 and 1989 totaling $50 mn.53 China became one of the government of Sudan’s principal arms suppliers in 1994 and still remains today.54 China is a preferred supplier in that it attaches no conditions to its arms sales other than monetary ones and oil concessions, and its weapons are relatively cheap. China sold Sudan SCUD missiles in 1996 in a deal underwritten by a $200 mn Malaysian government loan against future oil extraction.55 In 1990, the Sudanese government signed a deal worth $400 mn whereby China would supply arms to Sudan and receive cotton in return.56 It is not unusual for Beijing to offer the NIF soft loans for arms purchases, and one such loan is payable as late as 2005. A high ranking Eritrean military official reportedly criticised these arms transfers in discussions with Chinese officials, who subsequently defended their right to make such sales.57
4. A loyal ally
China has made it clear to the international community that it will tolerate no criticism of the government in Sudan. It has also used its position on the United Nations (UN) Security Council and on UN committees to block any action against Sudan and to silence opponents of the government of Sudan. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has rejected the imposition of sanctions against Sudan, and has also stressed that it is opposed to any intervention in the internal affairs of Sudan under the pretext of human rights violations.58 China recently used its position on the NGO decertification committee at the United Nations to discredit an NGO which had been publicly embarrassing the government in Khartoum by exposing the alleged practice of government supported slavery. Being largely influential in the committee alongside Yemen and Ethiopia, China aggressively lobbied against the NGO, Christian Solidarity International (CSI). The committee subsequently recommended that the CSI be
deprived of membership at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. This recommendation was
based on the fact that CSI had invited SPLA leader John Garang to address the UN Human Rights Commission.59 The fact that China defends Sudan even at the foreign policy level is indicative of its loyalty to the government of Sudan and the significance it attaches to the oil reserves which are its main strategic interest in that country. For as long as China and Sudan maintain close ties, Khartoum is likely to reap the benefits of a thriving oil industry, provided it is not disrupted by sabotage as part of the armed conflict.
PETRONAS OF MALAYSIA
Like the CNPC, Petronas Carigali is a state owned company, and its operations are very much an extension of the Malaysian government’s foreign and economic policy. The relationship between the Sudanese government and the Malaysian government is very similar to that with China in a number of ways. Trust has been developed between the two governments over the years. There have been notable economic transactions and Malaysia has displayed a willingness to invest in Sudan the same way as China. It should also be noted that Sudan’s Islamic banks have been heavily involved in Malaysia since the NIF took power. Malaysia’s loyalty to the government of Sudan was clearly displayed in 1997 when it paid $500 mn to the IMF on behalf of Sudan, in order to cover some of Sudan’s debt payments.60
1. Economic ties
One of Malaysia’s greatest ventures in Sudan, apart from the oil project, has been plans to manage the country’s transportation system. This has become an increasingly important sector with the development of the petroleum industry, as tankers will be needed to transport huge volumes of oil from storage facilities to ports for export. The Malaysian company Metrobus has also agreed to supply 1500 buses in several stages to Sudan.61 Following the bilateral commercial accords signed between Sudan and Malaysia in 1998, other projects have been initiated, such as a Malaysian oil palm plantation project in Sudan and the setting up of power generation plants.62
2. Alleged arms transfers
It is possible that the Malaysian involvement in covert arms transfers to Sudan has also won it favour with the government in Khartoum. According to Human Rights Watch, official documents have allegedly surfaced which detail Malaysia’s coordination in concluding arms deals between the Sudanese government and arms dealers in southeast Asia. According to the former Administrative Attaché at the embassy of Sudan in Kuala Lumpur, Abdel Khattab, heavy armaments including aircraft, tanks and mortars were procured in 1997 from China, Indonesia and the Russian mafia. These items were allegedly shipped to Sudan under the guise of petroleum exploration equipment, under the names of Petronas and the CNPC.63 The documents are said to reveal that a Malaysian government loan of $200 mn and funds collected by Islamic charity organisations were used to pay for the arms.64 Khattab defected to the opposition and sought political asylum in the Netherlands. If the allegations are credible it would directly implicate the two major partners in the Greater Nile Oil Project, CNPC and Petronas (together holding a 75 per cent stake), in arms transfers to the NIF. Being state owned companies it is hard to hold them accountable for such actions, particularly when there are no public shareholders who can bring pressure to bear on company executives.
Over and above Malaysia’s value to the government of Sudan in terms of potential military assistance and investment, the Malaysian National Petroleum Company, Petronas, plays an important role in the GNOP, and is the second largest stakeholder. It also owns a substantial percentage in the IPC oilfield adjacent to the Talisman operations in South Sudan. Petronas has extensive experience in oil exploration and the development and production of oil and gas overseas. The company is currently engaged in exploration and development activities in Vietnam,
Syria, the Philippines, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, China and Iran.65
OIL-RELATED CONFLICT
In many ways the partners of the GNOP, with their expertise and resources, have revived Sudan’s oil industry and, in the process, heightened the profile and significance of oil operations. This has
had a direct impact on the level of conflict surrounding the oilfields as the regime strives to protect and control oil areas while the opposition forces have identified the industry as a strategic
target. This is not a recent phenomenon, however, as oil operations have been a target of the SPLA since oil was first discovered in the early eighties. Since then the Sudanese government has implemented divide and rule strategies in an attempt to ensure its control over oil resources, with the effect of exacerbating armed conflict in the areas surrounding the oilfields. The strategies of the government of Sudan in terms of forging alliances and dividing its enemies have created many of the dynamics which exist today between armed factions that are continually locked in conflict. It is useful to trace the development of conflict around the oilfields in order to determine to what extent the oil industry has perpetuated conflict in Sudan.
1. Protection of the oilfields: NIF priority
Ever since the SPLA successfully managed to attack Chevron’s oil operations in Unity field in 1984, and bring about the withdrawal of Chevron from the oil industry, a key priority of the NIF has been to prevent similar disruptions and maintain firm control over oil areas. The strategies that the government of Sudan has used even from this early stage have not only fomented conflict but has had devastating consequences in terms of human security. One such suspected strategy that appears to be employed today is to clear oil rich lands of local inhabitants in order to enhance security around the oilfields. In 1984, the Nuer of Bentiu, surrounding the Unity oilfield, were overrun by militias armed by the government of Sudan. The government of Khartoum had supposedly instructed these militias to clear the oil lands of Nilotic inhabitants, using tactics such as massive air bombardments, raids and famine.66
2. Forging alliances
In the early eighties the regime also recognised that it needed to develop alliances with Southern factions which would be prepared to defend oil areas on behalf of the government of Sudan and fight against the SPLA. The regime found its proxy in Paulino Matip, who had belonged to the Southern separatist movement (Ananya) which fought the government between 1955 and 1972. He split from the mainstream to join forces with Ananya II to fight the SPLA. Capitalising on the opportunity to further divide Southerners and gain an ally, the regime brokered a ceasefire with Ananya II and began arming the Nuer forces of Matip in return for their military support. The
strategy worked as Matip’s militias became one of the most serious obstacles to the SPLA in the
Upper Nile between 1984 and 1987, as they would attack SPLA recruits on their way to training camps in Ethiopia. Ananya II also actively collaborated with NIF forces in attacking SPLA regiments, which threatened government-held areas.
In addition to maintaining an alliance with Matip, the Sudanese government encouraged further divisions within Southern rebel ranks, and sought to coopt other rebel leaders to fight alongside Matip in defending NIF interests and the oil areas. The second golden opportunity came when the former SPLA rebel zonal commander, Riek Machar, defected from the SPLA in 1991 and expressed interest in joining forces with Matip. This alliance was formalised in 1992 and brought additional Nuer forces into an anti-SPLA alliance. The regime supported these developments and sought to enhance divisions along ethnic lines between the Dinkas and Nuers in southern Sudan. The SPLA, under Dinka leader John Garang, was now in confrontation with rival Southerners under Nuer commanders Riek Machar and Paulino Matip. Machar made his alliance with the government of Sudan official by signing the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 with the NIF and forming the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), which comprised the six former rebel factions which also chose to side with the NIF. As a reward, Machar became the head of the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council, formed by the Khartoum government to rule the South. He also assumed the position of assistant to the President of Sudan.
3. Dividing the opposition
By placing loyal forces around the oil areas, the NIF has made it increasingly difficult for the SPLA to launch successful attacks against the oil operations as any attack would require an open offensive. The advantage to the regime is not only that it has gained two Southern allies to protect the oilfields, but also that inter-ethnic conflict in the South will pre-occupy SPLA forces and deter them from attacking oil operations.
The ethnic divisions exacerbated by NIF policies have also been highly successful in weakening forces in the South, as any SPLA attack on Nuer forces in Unity State has been seen as a Dinka attack on Nuer land, thus provoking retaliation. The recent grass roots peace agreement which was signed in May 1999 between civilian representatives of the Dinka and Nuer, is a cause of concern for the NIF. A civilian peace threatens the web of conflicting alliances sustained by the government. While the main accomplishment of this agreement is likely to be the reduction of
looting and raiding between the two ethnic groups, it could hold greater significance if tribal chiefs
were to unite politically.
4. Divide and rule - even among allies
One of the greatest surprises in the NIF’s strategy to protect and control the oilfields has been its recent moves to exacerbate conflict between its own allies. The Khartoum government’s objective in this regard is to prevent any Southerner from becoming too strong within the oil territory.67 By allowing NIF allies to battle each other, the government is able to maintain overarching control. There is always the fear that one of the Nuer leaders, especially Machar, may redefect to the SPLA and thus the Sudanese government wants to prevent Machar and Matip from becoming too powerful militarily. Recently, Khartoum’s military commanders have been concerned about Matip’s domineering behaviour in Bentiu, especially after the June 1999 killing of two government of Sudan’s regional Ministers and two elderly chiefs.68 Regardless of whether Matip or Machar gain the upper hand in inter-faction fighting, real control will remain with the government in Khartoum.
The conflict between Machar and Matip commenced at the end of 1997, when they disagreed over who should govern Unity State. When Machar’s preferred candidate won the election in December 1997, Matip detained the new Governor’s agents and this led to internecine fighting between Machar’s forces loyal to Governor Taban Deng Gai and the forces of Matip. This dispute was merely a precursor to the more fundamental problems that emerged between the two faction leaders over who is responsible for protecting the oilfield in Unity State. The Sudanese government allowed this ambiguity to continue and armed conflict to develop over the issue. Machar believed that he had been charged with defending the oilfield from SPLA attack from the time of the 1997 Peace Agreement when he was stationed in the region. Given the NIF’s suspicion of Machar, they preferred that he protect the areas outside Bentiu while Matip positions his forces in the vicinity of the oilfield. The regime was then able to ensure that fiercely loyal Mujahedeen and SDF forces encircle areas where the oil operations are located. This layered system of protection is a rational strategy of the NIF and the factional fighting enables Matip to act as a counterbalance to Machar. The government has been arming Matip’s forces much to the chagrin of Machar who claims that he has a right to receive arms as he is also a Major-General in
the SDF. Each spate of fighting between the forces of Matip and Machar causes the massive flight of civilians. In May 1999 alone, conflict prompted 3-4000 civilians to flee towards the South. Abuses have included the abduction of very young boys for use as soldiers, abduction of girls and women for sexual abuse, and a number of summary executions of women, never recorded prior to 1999. The conflict continues to engulf Northern Unity State and while it may appear as intra-ethnic fighting, it is likely a government strategy to safe-guard its interest in the oilfield. The government needs the revenue from oil production to continue waging its war in the wider theatre, potentially making the very presence of oil operations a deterrent to peace.69
5.The new pipeline and the prospect of associated conflict
While the oilfields have set the stage for conflict, the new pipeline that traverses much of Northern Sudan presents an additional corridor for armed clashes. Opposition forces in Sudan have expressed their dissatisfaction at the total insensitivity of the multinational oil companies to the dynamics of the war situation and the willingness to provide the NIF with oil profits which could finance the war effort. The objective of opposition forces is to delay the flow of oil through the pipeline so that the NIF is denied the proceeds. In May 1999, the SPLA warned Talisman and its Asian partners that it considers oil operations and particularly the pipeline to be legitimate targets in its war against the government. The SPLA has followed through, albeit on a small scale, with those threats by attacking oil installations in Unity State and targeting the oil pipeline. Other opposition groups belonging to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) have carried out similar attacks, such as the two major explosions which were carried out by Beja during the third week of July 1999 in the sea terminal of Baishir.70 The NDA has also claimed responsibility for the September 1999 bombing of the oil pipeline in the town of Atbara, 300 kilometers northeast of Khartoum which temporarily interrupted the flow of oil.
The SPLA has not been as active as it could have been in disrupting oil operations in recent months, but insiders claim that it intends to hold its fire until oil production is in full swing to wreak maximal damage both materially and morally. The SPLA has also discussed the need to solidify its position in the South by taking key government-held towns before it launches full-scale offensives against oil operations. While most of the oil pipeline is underground, the pumping stations remain vulnerable to rebel attack. The underground pipeline could also be attacked if its
location is known, and repair would be difficult especially if it were to be damaged in five or six places. The SPLA and the Sudan Alliances Forces (SAF) have opened up a new front on the Eritrean border, positioning themselves in striking distance of the pipeline as it approaches the Red Sea. The regime has foreseen the problem of SPLA attacks launched near the Ethiopian border, and has changed the original pipeline route envisioned by Chevron which ran through Kosti, to a route further westwards, well inside NIF controlled territory. It would be impossible for the government to heavily guard the length of the pipeline, which traverses the territory under threat from the rebels. The regime has attempted to put as much manpower as possible along the route, using largely unpaid militia forces known as mujahedeen. Active recruitment of thousands
of high school students and graduates is currently underway to join the ranks of the Defenders of the Oil Brigade. The Defense Minister Lt General Abdul-Rahman recently commented, ‘oil has become the real challenge...a contest between us and the evil spirited rebel forces.’71
THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF OIL-RELATED CONFLICT
1. Land clearances
The widespread conflict which has resulted from the NIF’s determination to control oil resources has had serious humanitarian consequences for the civilian populations located in the vicinity of the oilfields. Long-term efforts by various governments in the Sudan to protect oil production have included a policy of forcible population displacement to clear oil-producing areas and transportation routes of southern civilians who were suspected of supporting sabotage actions by the SPLA. Reports recently received by the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Leonardo Franco, indicate that this policy is still in effect. Death, famine and destruction have been part of the humanitarian impact of government or government-sponsored operations. It has been argued that local devastation and the killing of civilians is not merely a result of fighting between the government and its allies against opposition forces, but a systematic tactic on the part of the government to weaken the local population in these areas, and in some instances, to clear them off the land. The Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) recently claimed to have evidence of such land clearances around the oilfields in Sudan and video footage of alleged government operations has recently been broadcast in Europe. It is the contention of CSW and other international observers who have visited the area that the government intends to r
remove people from the land surrounding the oilfields not only to increase security but also to explore the land for additional oil reserves. While it is difficult to verify the claims and interpretation of recent events made by CSW, its observations are worth mentioning in this paper as few outsiders have gained access to the oil regions and managed to interview local inhabitants.
In June 1999, Baroness Caroline Cox, deputy speaker of the British House of Lords and President of CSW, visited the areas surrounding the oilfields with a cameraman and a team of observers. A report was produced following the trip which outlined the results of extensive interviews with local inhabitants and detailed the team’s observations. In reaction to what she saw, Baroness Cox stated: ‘I have seen at first hand graphic, indisputable evidence that western investment in the oilfields of Sudan is fuelling the genocide of people in Ruweng.’72 In a written press release Cox also claimed that last August’s ceasefire, negotiated by the British government to save millions of people from starvation in Southern Sudan, has been broken by the Sudanese in a series of attacks designed to seize billion dollar oilfields.73 It is the contention of CSW that, 1200 government forces swept through Ruweng County, killing scores of civilians, abducting hundreds and burning over 6000 homes.74 Ruweng County borders the oilfield in Unity state. The report also states that in a 10-day offensive, Antonov bombers, helicopter gunships, tanks and artillery attacked civilians across a 100 km swathe of territory. Survivors of the attacks are supposedly living in the bush without shelter, water or medicine and are likely to face a slow death from starvation. The delegation claimed to have seen burned villages, hospitals, churches and craters created by Antonov bombings. The report notes that the survivors interviewed pointed to oil as being the secret reason behind the attacks.
The independent journalist who accompanied the CSW delegation, cameraman Damien Lewis, made a number of interesting observations following the June trip. Lewis, who has visited the oil areas on a number of occasions, believes that a pattern has emerged in the way the NIF deals with local inhabitants in the oil areas. On an earlier trip to Sudan in June 1998, Lewis visited the areas bordering the Heglig oil concession where a similar situation to the present one existed North East of Bentiu. Lewis contends that large-scale human rights abuses were being perpetrated by forces allied with the government and thousands of homes had been destroyed
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